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1.  Introduction 
William J.  Barber's study of Alvin H. Hansen (1887-1975) emphasized 
the importance of the intellectual transformation that led to the "'Keynes-
Hansen intellectual system that appeared to have compelling diagnostic 
and prescriptive power" (Barber 19X7.  205).1  Between 1936 and 1938, 
Hansen became a convert to  Keynesian economics, and this led to  the 
Hicks-Hansen IS-LM model. Subsequent authors (including Phillips in 
the 1950s) concluded that this approach. being an equilibrium model, did 
not capture the disequilibrium "essence" of Keynes (Lipsey 19X I, 547). 
The purpose of this article is to highlight a second intellectual transfor-
mation in  Hansen's policy advocacy. and to suggest the possibility that, 
once again, Hansen contributed to a Keynesian economics that was in 
conflict with Keynes's stated position. I will also discuss a parallel trans-
fn[mation in  the policy advocacy of Sumner H.  Slichter ( 1892-1959), 
who was. like Hansen. a Harvard University professor. 
C(lIrcsponuencc may he  adure,sed to Dr.  Rohert Leeson. Economics Programme. School of 
Economics. Commerce allu Law. Murdoch University. :Ylurdoch. We,tern Australia () 150. Aus-
traiid.  This "rtide has been greatly improved by perceptive comments provided by  William 
1.  Barher.  .\. 1.  Brown. Graerne Donance. Milton  Friedman. Geotf Harcourt.  Frank  King. 
Dav id  Laidler. Keith Norris. Ray Pctridis. Rita Ricardo-Campbell. and !lerb Thomp,,'n. plus 
m·o anonymou, referees of flOPE. The usual disclaimef' apply 
I  William 1.  Barber's article henefited from  material on  Hansen in  the Harvard Arl'hives. 
Regrettahl:. It  seems that Ihere is  lillie. or nothlOg. in  Hansen's privale papers that could shed 
any light on the issues discu"eu here (correspondence from Barher. 7 December  199~  I. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Between 1936 and 1938, the time of his first transformation, Hansen 
was already well into middle age. Following  1938, he gradually expe-
rienced a second intellectual transformation: he recanted his opposition 
to inflation. In  1947, Slichter concluded that full employment was only 
tolerable when combined with stable prices (1947b, 68). Shortly after-
ward, he  appears  to  have  undergone a  metamorphosis similar to  that 
experienced hy Hansen. 
These intellectual transformations are particularly important because 
of Harvard's role in disseminating Keynesian perceptions among econo-
mists and the public in the  United States. It was  widely believed that 
Keynes had made  Marx redundant (Haberler  1961,  viii  n.  I; Slichter 
I  944c, 414-15).  But  it  was Hansen's "disciples [who1  dominated the 
World War II  Washington ideology in economics. We  live in the world 
Hansen helped to shape" (Samuelson 1975b). Slichter also directly influ-
enced Samuelson, Tobin, and others: and it is likely that the direction of 
these influences was not merely one-way (Samuelson 1956,373; Hansen 
I  947a, 552; 1949, vi; 1953, vi). A large number of alumni from Hansen's 
Fiscal Policy Seminar became influential economists in government and 
in  the universities (Salant 1976, 21-23). The inflation that engulfed the 
world  in  the  1970s was embarrassing to  these  Keynesian economists, 
and Hansen, but not Slichter, lived long enough to be alarmed about this 
(Haberler  1976,  13).  But hitherto, little attention has been paid to  the 
intellectual process by which the objective of zero inflation fell  from 
primary favor. 
There  are  many  differences  and  similarities  between  Hansen  and 
Slichter. but when it came to  inflation there was a considerable over-
lap,  not  only of policy prescriptions, but also of language."  Hansen's 
2.  H,m;cn and Slichter were hoth campaigning scholars. or puhlic  intellccluab. although 
Slichter. unlike Hansen, failed to "develop a coterie of followers 10 amplify his own influence" 
(Samuelson 1976a. 24). Both had been taught by John R. Commons (Dunlop 1961, xvii: Barher 
1  lJ~7.  19~i. Both. presumahly. had heen influenced hy the ideas of the Stahle Money League. led 
h, Commons and Irving Fisher: although Hansen (1960h. 27) suhsequently helieved that Com-
mons's conservative opponents were correct in  their policy prescriptions. Bolh were aftiliated 
"ith the Littaucr School, now renamed the John Fitzgerald Kcnnedy School of Government. 
Both had-hut subsequently lost-reputations for orthodoxy. Both "ere prepared to champion 
CelUses.  regardle" of how  unacceptahle those causes were  to  their colleagues (Salant  1976. 
22-23: :Vlason  19(1). Yet  in one important respect. Hansen and Slichter were at ,)pposite ends 
of the analytical spectrum. According to Samuelson (1947.  146). "the Keynesian taint is un-
mista~ahly there upon everyone of us  [Hansen.  Slichter.  myselrJ." But "Hansen's 
La,," was a modern theory of stagnation (Ahramovitz 1952.  169: Samuelson 1976b, 361 ). and 
a majority of Americans appeared to expect a postwar depression (Slichter [19421  1961.1'4: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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rolteJwe ,vith  respect to Keynes has been  traced back to  his  largely 
nonideological approach (Barber 1987,204). Slichter was also generally 
regarded as someone who could easily discard cherished views (Dun-
lop  1961. xx). This is, of course. an admirable scholarly quality.; The 
purpose of this essay is  to explore their ability to undertake intellectual 
transformations, in the context of the eclipse of the primacy of the goal 
of price stability. 
The organization of this article is as follows. In section 2,  I trace the 
evolution of perceptions about inflation, from the widely held proposi-
tion that ongoing inflation would produce unemployment to the  1960s 
view that ongoing inflation could be tolerated and that it could purchase 
sustainable benefits with respect to growth and employment. (More pre-
ci~ely. the argument stated that the fight against inflation was too costly 
in  terms of unemployment.) In  section 3.  I highlight the  significance 
of the passage of S.380-which became the U. S.  Employment Act.  In 
:-.ection  4. I offer an analysis of the influence that the Cold War had on 
the perceptions of economists. (Some economists came to believe that 
anti-inflation policies would weaken the struggle against communism.) 
In  sections 5 and 6. I examine the changing policy advocacy of Hansen 
and Slichter. Some concluding remarks are provided in section 7. 
Four clarifications are necessary. First, I am primarily concerned with 
developments in  the United States, and the Cambridge referred to is in 
1  'J4-fJ.  ~6: Han,cn  19~3. 121. In response to thi, prospecl. Hansen I.  19~6h. (7) ,'oined the phrase 
lh"l hCCCll11C  as,ociated with  1960s Keynesianism: "We now need to develop a new frontier. so 
to ,peak. in (lur (1\\ n hackyard and therehy open new outlets for private im eslment." In contrast. 
Slichtcr. ill  his ,wtemelll for posterity. listed ten positions that he had taken during his career as 
an economist. The fir't W'h. "The American economy is  not in danger of stagnation:' and the 
eighth was. "The view that the expansion possihilities of the American economv was consider-
ably llnderestimateu"  I 1961. xiv. xv 1.  This was also the theme of hi.s AEA Presidential Address 
,J'I~21. Slichtcr lout not  HelIlsen)  had been a leading "pre-Keynesian" oppnnent of annually 
balanced hudgets in  tiIlles of depression I Davis  1971.  12.  23). bUI  he "vigorously dissented" 
fn'IIl the stagndtion thesis ISlichtcr 1961. xii). Slichler helieveu that Kevne, had been "led intn 
h" e1Tnr  loy  his  failure to )2!asp the effects of tes'hnologieal research"ql9SXI  1961.  (15). He 
,tiso argu,'d that "The time i, ripe to rescue employment theory from its narww preoccupation 
"ith spending" I  19~6a.'IX)  . 
.  ,. Milton I-nedman. in  correspondence dated  I~ March Ilj94. has written:"J have llO doubt 
rh,rt  :COU  have Jone eomplele justice to Hansen and Slichter's views. Both were people of vcr, 
hi"h stanJard, "no Illtc)2rity. and of great tirmness of conviction once the conclu.siun had heen 
rcacheu. Both ,hould he applauded for their willingness to change views. even though J happen 
to believe that the view, they changed to were wrong. J did not myself know Hansen well hut J 
dlLi rnl.?et him d  fc\v  time.; and formed a very high opinion of him a~ a hUlnan being despite my 
or"iou,,- di~agrl'Cm(,llh with him on economic matters"-Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Massachusetts, not England. Second. if  inflation were defined to include a 
once-and-for-all increase in the price level, then the dichotomy outlined 
in  thi~ article  would collapse.
4  I  therefore  define  inflation to exclude 
the occasional and exceptional  resort to such measures.  It is  ongoing 
inflation. over time, that I am concerned with here. 
Third, the evidence appears to suggest that the intellectual transforma-
tion described in this article largely occurred in the early postwar period, 
with 1948 standing out as a watershed year.  But we are implicitly deal-
ing with self-conscious revolutionaries (see. for example. Klein] 950), 
who were very alert to tactical and strategic maneuvers (see, for exam-
ple, Hansen] 947d, 200). As Galbraith put it, "It is  not possible for any 
reputable American to be overtly in favour of inflation: it is a symbol of 
evil. like adultery, against which a stand must be taken in public however 
much it is enjoyed in private" (r] 952] 1957, 209). Likewise, Albert Hart. 
of the Committee for Economic Development (CEO), noted that some of 
those who were prepared to accept the inflationary consequences of the 
pursuit of full  employment "seem to rest their hopes on keeping infla-
tion unnoticed" (1946, 288). It is to be hoped that this will not be taken 
as a slur on the character of any of the participants in these debates: it 
merely recognizes that those who go down to  the political marketplace 
in  search of influence are usually very alert to the  prejudices of their 
audience. Besides, it seems unlikely that the inflationary sentiments dis-
cussed in this article would have been formulated-but not explicitly, or 
publicly. expressed-much earlier, since ongoing inflation only arrived 
on the agenda of American policy formulation in the  I 940s. But those 
who opposed S.380 were timid in their advocacy of the necessity of a 
4.  In  1'123. Hansen noted that postwar real wages were 32 percent higherthan before the war: 
"The easiest way of escape is  by price intlation." allowing a fall  in  real wages and an  increase 
in elnplo) men!: 'This will give temporary respite to the qruggle. But it will only he temporary. 
Each succeeding drop in  prices will hring a recurrence of the struggle"  (1923, .. 2:  Hansen and 
Tout 1933.  1  ..  71.  During the  1'130s, Slichter was prepared to countenance deficit financing as 
a method of halting the decline in  prices, or in  permitting their ri,e (1961. 77. 304-5. 89). To 
"inllate the general price level slightly.  .  hut not too l11uch"  would allow real wages to fall. 
and  w(lulu  ameliorate technological  unemployment (Slichter 119321  1961.  313:  I 944b, 411 
Indeed. such "fiscal inflation" was cOl11l1lonly advocated in the early 1930s by several Chicago 
ccollonllSb. such as Jacob Viner and Frank Knight. and b) W.  C. Mitchell and the Columhia 
Univcr>ity COlnmi"jon on Economic Reconstruction (Davis 196R: Viner 1964.263-64: Knight 
19.17.122-23: Hansen  1'152.311-12: Friedman 1'167,8-9: Keyncs 1936.258: Smithies 1946. 
221.  Also. a "grauual and orderly risc" in the price level was advocated to remove war-induced 
price-wage distortions. and to facilitate the only politically 'Kccptable method of reducing the 
Americ.m tariff (Slichtcr 1'144c. 41 .. : 1'144a ...  7) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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""floating pool of unemployed" (Bailey 1964, 131: see. for example. Was-
SOIl  1945-46, 517-18). In the immediate postwar environment this was 
simply all  unacceptable position. A  similar tactical  restraint may also 
have constrained discussion by advocates of S.380. 
Did Hansen and Slichter mold or reflect changing professional judg-
ments about inflation'?  It seems likely that they  were largely  molding 
opinion: and hoth were uniquely placed to do so. Further research may 
reveal  whether they  were also influenced by  an  oral tradition, or by a 
literature that this article has neglected. But Gottfried Haberler ( 1972, 
135). also of Harvard. had no doubt about the continuity between these 
\iews alld the econometric work derived from Phillips's seminal curve. 
Last. economists were grappling with the new problem of how to guar-
antee full  employment against a background of increasing trade union 
power. Some economists believed that the logic underlying the Keynes-
ian revolution would have consequences "more revolutionary than those 
of Marxism ... more so than most contributors to it have yet seen-or 
said" (Ayers 1946, 124). Some feared that the new situation might make 
"price inflation a necessary concomitant of full employment forcing the 
unpalatable alternative of underemployment or inflation ... we should 
not encourage the various economic groups in  the belief that they will 
be protected from the consequences of their own folly  by  government 
~pending ....  In  so far as the Keynesian Revolution has come to this. 
it  IS a purely inflationary philosophy which must end in disaster" (Mor-
ton  I  Y50.  13. 36). Others, such as Hansen and Slichter, formed ditferent 
judgments.  The~e views about the relatively benign nature of creeping 
intlatinn may have been formulated as an antidote to the alarmist state-
menh made, for  example, by Jaques Rueff in  the  Qllarterlv Journal 
of Ecol1olllics.) Below, I examine the circumstances under which these 
alternative judgments were formed. 
'. Rueff (1<),) 7,365-671 argued that "an investment program tinanced hy inflatioIl can bring 
"huut an  illcrease of employment.  . Ithis] will produce aitlng "ith a rise in  thc general level 
"f price. allthe ecnnolTlic and social disorders ,,,sociated with inflation. If we wish to avoid the 
Jailer \vithuut ahandonin,~ the invcstnlcnt program which ha~ given ri:--c to them. there \H)uld he 
110 other "J\ulilln hutto Innit demand hy a systcm of general rationing. Thus. the inauguration 
"f.( \ ast progr,jfll of public works. if it  is carried out over a prolonged period. will revive in the 
wl,rld an ccnnomic regimc imented hv Hitler, from which \ ictory was supposed to free us.  We 
,.hall  sec the restrainls progre"ively tightening and expanding. and the stead) unfolding of the 
tal!liliar prell"'"  of inflation will again hring ahout the suppressilln of all  human liherties 
I .IIn conlldent that  Ithe  policy  suggested hy  Keynesl  will  not reduce  uncmployment, except 
to  ,r  vcr}  limited extent. hut that it will have profound consequencc~ upon the evolution "fthe 
countries in  which it i, "pplicci.  .. Whom Jupiter wi,he, to dc,troy, he  first  rna~es mad." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2. The Eclipse of the Goal of Zero Inflation 
Belief in the importance of price stability had, with the attachment to the 
principle of free international trade, been almost universally accepted by 
mainstream economists up until this period. Slichter noted that virtually 
everyone wa~ opposed to inflation (1948, 4). It was, and is, one of those 
"platitudes"  and "banalities"  without which "the most acute minds are 
liable to go astray" (Robbins, quoted in  Cairncross  1985, 3).  Seymour 
Harri:-, (1945.8) described inflation as "a symptom of disease, of a gen-
eral breakdown of the economic body," and argued that a monocausal 
explanation of inflation would be an "unsound investigation." Harris ad-
vi\ed the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in January 1948 
that "unless we stop inflation this year we are going to have a galloping 
inflation,  a real  inflation"  (quoted in Goodwin and  Herren  1975, 52). 
Hansen initiated a series of meetings of economists that resulted in a re-
port submitted to President Roosevelt in October 1944, which concluded 
that stability in the cost of living was essential if full employment was to 
be  maintained (Goodwin and Herren  1975,  10).  Yet within a few years 
of the passage of the Employment Act, a remarkable transformation was 
under way, and Slichter (1952a. 53) characterized the view that inflation 
would "threaten the stability of the national economy and the security of 
the entire Western world"  as an "uncritical and almost hysterical fear."(, 
The axiom that ongoing inflation would be followed by more inflation 
and  a  deterioration  in  economic performance  had  heen  accorded the 
status of an eternal truth by most economists prior to about 1960.
7 The 
maintained hypothesis of most economic thought was that inflation was 
associated with instability and would therefore prodllce and not reduce 
unemployment. Price stability should therefore be pursued as a primal'\' 
h. "'The recent decline in COlbumer spending' said a conference of distinguished Americans. 
'is only  a lull  in  a continuation of inflation that threatens the stahility of the national cconom: 
and the security ()f the entire Western \'orld.· This view of inilation i, typical of hundreds that 
II,,\ e heell lllade during [he  past fe\\'  years. It rcllcets the  uncritical and almost hysterical fear 
Ih"t the thllught of inflation arouses in a large parl of the cllllllllunily. It abo rdlecb failure to 
scc somc of the prohlems, that confront the country and that can he solved hest through a slo\\ 
r"e in  prices" (Shchter 1952a. 531. 
".  F()r  195(h expositions,  ,ee  Fellner  1956:  Butler  1957:  Adalll'  1957:  Reierson  1957: 
Sprinkel  Ill5~: [IIi,s  195X:  Tongue  1958:  Jac<)hy  IllS7:  see aiso  Balderstone as  quoteu  in 
Slil·hter  1957c.  Peacetime gmernments and central hanks were perc'ei\cd as  heing "the rc' 
\lLlinil1g  force"  prc\cnting peacetime hoom:-.  Iro111  heing olher than  temporary:  "the puhlic 
aUllwritics will Ix nceeuingly anxious to prcvent [the large and rapid rise in  general prices I" 
iPl~()lI  1<)49,  1311-11.  146). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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goal: and economic growth. and hence high levels of  employ ment. would 
follow as a consequence.x 
In  the  1930s.  unemployment  wa~ the  dominant trauma.  and  some 
econ()mi~t~ became  obsessed  with  the  problem  of full  employment 
(Samuebon 1953.546-47; Meier 1984, 11: Wallich 1968.350; Bronfen-
brenner 1948.373). Many of Keynes's disciples. such as Joan Robinson. 
David Worswick. and J. K. Galbraith, were concerned about the inflation-
ary con-;equcnce of full employment-in keeping with the pessimistic 
atmosphere of  the time~  (Galbraith 1941.83; 1947,292; Samuelson 1946. 
191 n. 5). But in the 1  940s, many economists came to believe that full em-
ployment need not be accompanied by inflation  I. Kalecki  1943; Sweezy 
1946.302; Beveridge. quoted in  Fellner  1946,324: Hansen  1947a).~ 
Singer ( 1984.  276) concluded that  this was a  period of '"naive  utopi-
anism" (Simons 1942. 162;  1948, 157, 185). In  the 1950s, full employ-
ment seemed rather elusive. or at least ill-defined; yet some commen-
tator~ concluded that "th(' economy has (1/1  injfationan bias" (Slichter 
8. Occasloual1y• one COllle, across titles such as 'The E\ il  Effects "f MOlletary In\lahility 
011  the Creation "f Wealth" (Rohertson  192,).  13).  accompanied hy  a  seellon entitled 'The 
C"c f\)r a (jentl) Rising Price Level"' (Rohcrbon 192.).722-25: see also Smithie, 19,)6.  ~6). 
Roherhofl's huok  MOlin  was  hegun  in  the northern  summer of 1920. during the  period of 
pr.)fOLlnd  post\\ar  ~ri:-,i"  for  European civilization.  It  j:-,  tempting to  ~('c  ~il1lilaritic:-, hel\\:een 
Rohert son's fears. and thOse' of Hansen and Slichter in the post-Second World \Var period: "On 
lh,:  \Vhnk.  if we 'vcre pcrfectly free to choose. we should perhaps stick fairly cl(beiy to our 
"r1ginal decisi',1l1  tu keTp the pric(>1cvel  stahle. Bul wc should he prepared either to suspend 
our Jl'ci~ioll. l)r to cumpd the lnerhauhng of mom:y contracts, in eXl'cptional circumstances: 
alld ..,0  li.Jn~ at <lIly rate a\ we preserved the  ~::-,tL'm \ariol1:-.1y  klloVltl a:-.  Pri\ate Enterprise and 
\\'ge Slan:r). \Ve  should !lot  refuse to wink  at  a  lillIe judicious lISC  of the  mOl1ey-pump.  if 
Ihe  I) res .)f industr)  scemed to  he sagging unduly" (Rohertson  192,).  1251.  Later. Roherhon 
warned that "It Illay  not be \vi'lc to regard the attainment even d1' an employment nhjcL'ti\t.'  in 
]1.sdf reasonahly cOl1cei\ed as in all circul11stances the ahsolutely overriding ailll \)1' all policy 
rhis Illost sacrd of all (he cO\Vs"  (1966.2561. Likc\Vise. there is  in The General Theory a 
relldency to ace'Cpt a rise' in the price level '" a Il1ure pal,ltahle and successful method of CUlling 
n:al w;,ge'S.  th,m a direct "ssault on Illoney wages. In Hm\ to  Pm'filr Ih,'  H~I/-. Keynes 119,)0. 
2~-~() ) sugge:-.teJ that  iJlf1atioll~'"\\'ith its evil ~(lcial COIl:-.equellccs I  while ,"11:--0  being] a might) 
tax  ~athcrer"--might he enlisted for (he duration of the'  war in order tn supplement \"luntar) 
'~lvillt:,. But  Kcyne" n:,cr\L'J an c~p~cially "ilrio\1c :-.tyle of language to Je:-'-..Tihc  the l:ullap'c 
(,j  (lutf'UI  and employl11enl  that would follm'  frol11  ongoing intlation I Haher1cr 1961.5(1-60: 
Humphrey l'iS]: Hutehisoll  1')77: Meade  1993  . .)1. 
l), The ",JI'illlon)wl( linl/ nfgovcrnmcnt finance.  .  j:-, the pennancnt l'limlIlatiull of the t\\ in 
C\ ih oiun,'mp]OVJ11cnt and intlalion" (Lerner 19')3a.  132: Swee/Y 1t).)6. 301-21. "'In  the past 
th.: ehel"  on this Llpward I  illtlationar) I pressul\, ha, heenthe large resene arlllY of unel11plo)ed. 
:\')\\' that \\ \.'  h<'l\ (' di:-.c()\ efL'U that unemployment is  Ji~pen:-:.ahk. \\ c IlCCJ some other <lnd  more 
r~',l~unahk !lla  ..... hmcry tu t;.th.c  oVer the fUllctiPIl i.lf stabili:-.ing the ~encral \\ agl...·  le\'cl. Tili;.,  is our 
11:lht impI)rtdllt un,nh'L'd L·colHHnic  rrohkm·· (Lerner 19-+6.  :'J~ I Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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19fd, ~9l. Inflationary expectations had become embedded in the econ-
omy (Slichter 1951 b, 107; Burns 1960, 18). But many economists were, 
understandably, reluctant to abandon the moral imperative of achieving 
full  employment, which was perceived to  have an  almost  miraculous 
effect on  the problems of distressed areas, tarill's, quotas, monopolies. 
and so forth (Samuelson 1953. 558 n.  8). There appears to have been a 
large constituency for this judgment: "Just as the public is  'agin sin' it is 
against unemployment" (Samuelson 1953,549). Likewise, it was recog-
nized that the early stages of inflation were attractive to some politically 
powerful groups (Reierson 1957. 160). Galbraith constructed a theory of 
countervailing power to explain why inflation was the compromise so-
lution that emerged from the de  facto coalition between employers and 
unions ([ 1952]  1957, 147-48). Samuelson, in his Economic Task Force 
report to  President-Elect Kennedy, wrote that "history reminds us  that 
even in  the worst days of the great depression there was never a short-
age of experts to warn against all curative public action. on the grounds 
that they were likely to create a problem of intlation. Had this counsel 
prevailed here. <h it did in pre-Hitler Germany, the very existence of our 
form of government could be at stake. No modern government will make 
that mistake again" (quoted in Garvey 1975.402). 
Jacoh Viner, in  his American Economic Association presidential ad-
dress, warned the profession that "some economists haw he en discarding 
too indiscrimi nately their inherited intellectual ballast, with the result that 
they sway too easily with each passing wind ... let us pay heed to the 
old as well as the new wisdom, and let us especially beware of old poi-
-;ons  in new bottles" (1940.  16,  17).  After the war. there was a gradual 
change of emphasis regarding the primary goal of macroeconomic pol-
icy. and Slichter (1950d, 44) began to argue that increasing production, 
not  controlling inflation,  was  the country's major economic problem. 
Gradually, some economists came to see ongoing inflation as  being no 
longer self-defeating, but potentially beneficial. 
Inflation had previously been generally regarded as a response to some 
particular event.  often a  war.  and was thought to  last only as  long as 
the  event  with  which  it  was  associated.  The inflations accompanying 
the  post-Second World War reconstruction and the  Korean  War  were 
perceived to be war inflations, and by  1953, according to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). it was hoped 
that a new period of inflation-free economic expansion was under way 
(Fellner et  al.  1961).  But between  1953  and  1959,  inflation did  be-Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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come persi"tent in  the main industrial countries, and the second Eisen-
hower Administration, particularly under Raymond J. Saulnier's Council 
of Economic Advisors (CEA) chairmanship, preferred to tolerate high 
unemployment as an alternative to inflationary pressures (J acoby 1957. 
160-61 ).  According to Slichter, the Federal Reserve "blunder" of  August 
1957. when credit and money were tightened, was due to the authorities 
being excessively concerned with upward price movements (1961, 121). 
Other economists formed different judgments. Beryl Sprinkel ( 1958.83-
84). citing evidence from Friedman and Schwartz. recommended to the 
Joint  Economic Committee (JEC) that the  1946 Employment Act be 
amended to explicitly incorporate the goal of zero inftation. Neil Jacoby 
( \957.  160-6\) believed  that Eisenhower had  "elevatel  d I the  goal  of 
price stability-now implicit in the Employment Act-to an explicit po-
sition ...  a primary aim offederal economic policy."  The CEO strongly 
supported this proposition. arguing that 6 percent unemployment, com-
bined with the absence of widespread unionization, could achieve price 
stability (Barkin 1958,3-4,6). Nevertheless, there was a gradual change 
in professional economic opinion (Gordon 1975,95). 
In  the  I 960s. this change manifested itself in the widespread belief in 
the  exi~tence of a stable and exploitable relationship between inftation 
and unemployment. The lower section of Samuelson and Solow's curve 
(1960,  192) could have met with no resistance from the zero-inflation 
advocate" at the CED and elsewhere: their curve crossed the axis at 5.5 
percent unemployment, only slightly  below  the  CED estimate.  Ironi-
cally. Phillips (1962,10), Slichter (1961,291; 1959c), Klein and Bodkin 
( 1964. 392. 425), and Scitovsky and Scitovsky (1964. 445-46) all came 
t(l much more pessimistic conclusions regarding the unemployment cost 
of stable prices in the United States. But it was the possibility of trading 
olf unemployment for inflation on the upper section of Samuelson and 
Solow's curve that was unacceptable to zero-inflation advocates such as 
Phillips (Leeson I 994b, 1997b). 
Desai  (1992.  19)  noted that  in  the  1950s "Keynesians were  blase" 
when confronted with complaints about inflation. Galbraith concluded 
that "the bogey of inflation has now replaced the bogey of  socialism as the 
barrier to enlarged and improved public services ... it is a much more 
effective bogey" ( 1960, 75). Slichter began to see merits in continuous 
inflation. as opposed to the "serious injustices" of stable prices ( 1952a. 
53 J.  Slichter was intluential in  Washington, and these views gradually 
pameated the academic community. At a Lionel Robbins seminar in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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mid-1950s, Kelvin Lancaster asked why 2 percent per annum inflation 
wa~ perceived to be a major problem; and the reply was perceived to be 
unconvincing {conversation with Lipsey,  15  July  1993),10  Economists 
such as Richard Ruggles. Abba P.  Lerner. and Albert Rees argued before 
the JEC that the welfare losses of  2 or 3 percent inflation were less than the 
welfare losses of 2 or 3 percent unemployment above the frictional level 
(Teper 195X.  265;  Hansen  1960b, 65-66), Highly influential members 
of the CEA, such as Keyserling, saw full employment as a precondition 
for the tight against inflation (Goodwin 1975,6). Slichter argued that "it 
will be anti-inflationary for the government to spend as much money in 
the calendar year 1958 as possible .. ,  ,The reason is that the economy 
will have more unused capacity during this period than it will have later 
on" (1961. 129-30; in contrast. see Slichter I 947b, 67-68). 
The pursuit of price stability came to  be  perceived as  an obstacle to 
growth. and trade union-sponsored economists, such as Solomon Barkin, 
could describe the  unemployment consequences of the policies of the 
"price-stability flrst  group" as  "unacceptable to the American people" 
(Barkin 1958.9). One of Slichter's (1961,141) tinal statements became 
almost a manifesto in the  1960s: "As the public realise that the bad re-
sults of inflation have been greatly exaggerated and that some of these 
re~ults will not happen at all, it  will give attention to  other problems-
particular the problem of unemployment and of achieving an adequate 
rate of growth."  In this way, the advocacy of zero inflation became trans-
formed, in the 1950s, from an axiom or eternal truth to the position of a 
"group" whose views were "unacceptable"; and in the  1960s, to  a dis-
tinctly old-fashioned-sounding minority. Even the Natural-Rate Expec-
tations Augmented Phillips curve (N-REAP) model contained, at least 
prior to  Friedman's Nobel  Lecture (1977), the assumption that in  the 
long run the performance of the economy, and hence the rate of unem-
ployment. was neutral with respect to the rate of inflation-a suggestion 
that would have been regarded as outrageous by economists prior to the 
episode de~cribed in this article. 
This transformation can be illustrated by Nicholas Kaldor's memoran-
dum to the Radcliffe Committee. which contained a section titled "The 
Dangers of a Regime of Stable Prices," In  response to questioning from 
Alec Cairncross. Kaldor declared that "given the present dynamism of 
](),  R\)hertson, (iting SlichteL concluded that  ., 'stability'  almost ,celllS to  have heen  1<" 
dc/illed in  tcnm "r a  ~ or 3 pef cent annual risc" 11966, 2491. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the  British economy. to keep the  ~hip on  an even keel  and to  prevent 
it  from floundering may require doping it H'ith  il\fiariol1  because its dy-
namism  i~ low" lemphasis addedJ. 11  Cairncross stated that "you are the 
tirst  witne~s we have had who is a whole-hearted believer in  inflation, 
if I ha\e understood your memorandum aright.  You  do not regard it in 
any  way as  a regrettable necessity  but you  actually seem to welcome 
ir)"  Kaldor replied. "I would not say that. I don't know what I have said 
to  ~uggest that."  Cairncro~s concluded that Kaldor's evidence implied 
that "i f we want to e-;cape from economic stagnation, Vie must reconcile 
ourselves to rising prices." Kaldor replied, "unless the economy is suf-
ficiently dynamic to get us  out of this dilemma"  (Radcliffe et al.  1960. 
715). Subsequently. political partie~. "uch as the British Labour Party, be-
gan to formulate policies on the assumption of ongoing inflation (Hayek 
1<)91. 296). In  1962. President Kennedy a-.ked Heller to brief him on the 
"po~~ible benign effects ofa 'little inflation'" (Barber 1975. 177), 
Before Samuelson's textbook, Keynesian perceptions were propagated 
through a scattering of graduate seminars (Jones 1972, 130; Coal', 1980. 
6(8). But there was no uncertainty ah(mt the reception to Keynes's ideas 
among some Cambridge economists: "Here was a remedy for the despair 
that could he  seen just beyond the Yard" (Galbraith  1971. 50; Samucl-
..,on  1947.  145). Yet  The General Theory was regarded, by at least one 
Cambridge economist. as  "not well  suited for classroom usc.  It  is  ar-
rogant.  had tempered,  polemical" (Samuelson  1946.  190).  Keynesian 
macroeconomics-or, at least, one version of it-was not codified until 
the first edition of Samuelson's textbook (1948b).12 It rapidly conquered 
economics departments all over the  world (Elzinga  1992).  Samuelson 
concluded lhat "if price increases could be held down to say less than 
:')  per cent  per year.  such  a  mild  steady  inflation  need  not  cause too 
much concern" (1948h. 282). In their seminal AEA paper, Samuelson 
and Solow concluded that 4 or 5 percent inflation "would ~eem  to be the 
II  K"ldor continueo: "Some of my  colleagues would regaro economic growth as  ha\'ing 
\cr)  10"  priorIt}  as compared with the stability of the value of mone): it  depends on one's 
",t elf  "tiue-judgcment.s and social preferenc·cs.  I would regard the smt of inflation we have 
heen !la\ ing. 1)1" the order of J lo 4 percent a year. as  ~~ considcrahly lesser evil than c(onomic 
"agnation or ma" unemployment or imtability in production" I  Radcliffe ct a!.  1960.715-171. 
12.  Stricti)  speaking. this is  not accurate. TLrshis', text appeared in  1947. but fur reasons 
associakd with the Cold War.  was never a  strong challenge to  SatllLLelson's  (Ellinga  19LJ2: 
Harcoun I 99'i I.  [LjLIally, 'vleade's 1l1lroducfioiliO Ecollomic AI7o/Y.lis (lild Po/ic.'· was puhlished 
L11  IlJ31J:  "James having been one of the half-doLen people in the worlo who understood The 
(;l'lI('mi Th"o!"\' hefore it was puhlished" (colTespond~nce from A. J.  Brown. 29 ,,·Iarch  1(94). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ncce~;,ary cost of high employment and production in  the years imme-
diately ahead" (1960.  192).  It  was this judgment about  the~e potential 
benefits-which would  be  forgone  if zero inflation  were the  primary 
target of economic policy-that colonized the economics profession in 
the  1960s.  It  was this judgment that enabled Tullock to conclude that 
"apparently the Keynesian era is drawing to a close. and it appears to be 
leaving the United States and England in a most perilous state. Its legacy 
of  ~ignificant inflation with high unemployment may be with us for some 
time to come ... the standard Keynesian remedy [is]  morc inflation" 
(1<)72. -1-29). 
The trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve became the applied 
macroeconomic  application  of the  Keynesian  neoclassical  synthesis. 
which Samuelson had outlined in the third edition of his textbook (1955. 
360). hut which Hansen and others had formulated much earlier. It quan-
tified the cost of a stable aggregate price level (in terms of  high unemploy-
ment). and also suggested that tolerable and predictable rates of inflation 
were as<;ociated with lower levels of unemployment. In  1973. Samuel-
<;on  advised the lEe that "I would not ... think it disastrous if we went 
from  now  until  the end of the world at 6 percent inflation with every-
thing adjusted to that" (quoted in  Breit and Ransom [ 1971]  1982. 131). 
Samuelson was  not the  only economist to  reach such  a conclusion." 
Equally.  a  monocausal explanation of the  numerical  value of the  rate 
of inflation. which in  its more mechanical interpretation could be  read 
off from a statistically estimated and negatively sloped Phillips curve. 
came also to be widely accepted at  this time.l-l  Inflation was also per-
ceived as being ea~ily reversible (should preference~ change. the system 
could bc  shifted down the Phillips curve to a lower level of inflation). 
This explanation for, and tolerance of. inflation. eventually facilitated the 
l1lonetari"t and  ~upply side anti-Keynesian revolutions. which. in  turn. 
led many Keynesians to return to orthodoxy with respect to the goal of 
p, T"hin c(lncludcci that "once the 'tmg is remO\cd from inllation. there i, nothing wrong 
v. itb ha\ ing morc of it" t 1967, 106). "Anticipated inflation i,;  hannle" inllation,  .  so let us 
clim  at  tbe -I  percent unemployment rate.  and accept the -I  percent lIl11atiol1  which comes 
v. ith  if' ,Tobin and R,,,s  197 L  2-1:  Tobill and Ross  1972: Rees  I ')7{)\,  [n  196';, the  [nslitu~e 
uf t-collomic Affair,; published a paper that concluded that "'b soon as the likelihood of price 
Inflatioll  is generally recognised.  the traditional ill-effects of price inflation.  .  become 
I1cgligihk"  (Farrell [1%511'172,1)<1). 
I-k Toilin and Ros"  concluded that"we can live with inflation. but we (annot afford a stagnant 
ecollofll~,  .  one of the most di"nal and best verified o\1scrvatillllS of modern c('unomies is 
that there is  ordinarih a trade off between the rate of inllatioll and the rate of UIll'mplllyment" 
ill)71.~h.23). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Lero  inflation (for example. Lipsey  1990). Monocausal ex.planations of 
inflation also appear to have been superseded. 
It would be unsettling to our scientific credentials if policy advocacy 
""ere  primarily the product of fashion.  unmixed with ancient wisdom. 
There seems ~omething  almost inesistible about the evolution of  thought 
discussed in  this essay. notwithstanding the optical illusion that serves 
to  distort the  vision of all  historians. A group of economists. it seems. 
had pre-wired themselves for the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips 
curve.  A~ Tobin put it. "Hansen must have found irony in the 'new eco-
nomics' label attached to the 1961-65 revival of his central ideas but he 
certainly rejoiced in the substance ... a gentle revolutionary who lived 
to  see his cause triumphant and his heresies orthodox"  (1976. 35. 37). 
Although The  Nell'  Ecollomics (Hanis  1947) became associated with 
The  NeH  Inflation (Jones  1973), this is not to suggest that a triangle of 
Cambridge economists (Hansen, Slichter, and Samuelson) sought to en-
courage in rlation: only that they came to see the unemployment cost of 
>-table aggregate prices as being too high to pay. Inflation had become per-
sistent: the cost of reducing it would be paid in terms of unemployment. 
Ongoing inflation carne to be viewed as something that could be tolerated 
hecause of perceived benefits on the jobs front. The trade-off interpreta-
tion of the Phillips curve was accepted first in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
from \\here it  wa~ transmitted, by Samuelson. Solow. and others. to the 
rest of the profession. It provided the quantification for a position that 
had. in a sense. already been adopted. 
The process by which this happened involved a number of  related per-
ceptions that only became fully articulated in the 1960s. First. there was 
the vie\v that inflation was. at least in part. a statistical illusion. generated 
hy the inahility of the price indexes to take account of quality improve-
ments. The components of the basket of goods and services that were 
used to calculate the price indexes were changed too infrequently. This 
imparted an upward bias in the measure of inflation (Slichter 1946a, 304; 
Seldon 1959.3; Haberler 1961. II; Klein and Bodkin 1964.372). Second, 
there was the argument that the consumer price index was heavily loaded 
with service items, which provided fewer opportunities for productivity 
gains. Thus. any  ill-conceived attempt to  stahi lile the consumer price 
index  would condemn the economy to a falling wholesale price index, 
which was likely to be incompatible with the required rates of economic 
growth (Hansen 1  960b. 8). Third, there was the theoretical analysis that 
indicated that the conditions for a flight from money-the tendency for 
creeping Il1flation  to degenerate into hyperinflation-were quite strict Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and unlikely to occur in practice (Slichter 1957a. 51-53: 1951c. 34: but 
see  Reier~on 1957.  150-52). Fourth. there was an attempt to "debunk" 
some "fads."I'  Klein  and  Bodkin (1964. 368-69, 4(4) argued that the 
"fad of  chronic underemployment" had been replaced by "a new fad ... 
that we were entering an era of  secular inflation." It would be a mistake to 
suggest that authors such as Klein and Bodkin were misrepresenting Si-
mons, Fellner. and other zero-inflation advocates;  16  they merely came to 
a different judgment about the./irst priority of macroeconomic policy. 17 
Hence it  is appropriate to refer to the eclipse of the objective of zero 
inflation. The containment of inflation did not disappear from the policy 
agenda, as witnessed by the introduction of wage-price guideposts in the 
LJ nited States in  1962. These economists did not abdicate their respon-
sibilities with respect to containing inflationary forces in  the post-1965 
period (Lodewijks 1991.308; Tobin 1984. 103: Solow 1983,280: 1984, 
134).  It was political forces that eclipsed their ad\'icc: "It was straight 
politics.  .. Inflation seemed the preferable alternative" (Solow  1992, 
1(3). Even  when political forces  were organized to effect disinflation, 
the costs of this operation were. at least in the United Kingdom, much 
more severe than economists predicted (Laidler 1985). 
3. The Employment Act 
One of the pertinent changes in the economic and political environment 
in the late 1940s was the passage of the Employment Act, signed Public 
Law 304, on 20 February 1946 (Bailey 1964. vii). A 1944 Fortune poll 
I'. "Before the Gener,,! Theo!'\'.  . there were.  .  formidable oh,tacles in the way of the 
dC\l'loprllent of what we now con,ider sensihlc liscal and monetary policies.  . There was an 
irwucljuate unLicr,wnuing of the process of inflation. The prevailing idea,. ill fact hordered on 
a ht'ticf in  magic. 
produce intlation  . 
lit wa,1 thought thai an increase in  the ljuantity of mone,  would surely 
lack of unuer,tanding of thc process of inflation leu to the  fear that 
lIltlation might ea,il)  he triggereu if the government followed the  wrong policics. This acted 
'" a  powerful deterrent to experimentation in the drea of fiscal and monetary policy" (Sweezy 
ILJ7c.II,\--17i. 
I h.  Linlkr the ,uhtitlc "Economists' Fad""  Klein and Bodkin I 19f1-l.  '\fl~-69. -10-11 di,cussed 
S imlHh', and Fcllncr', arguments that thc pup,uit offul! employment could only lead to inllation. 
S,m.)[1s drgucd that full  cmployment was not a rational ohjective. and thercfore zero inflation 
\V,,,  .. tlw  ,)Illy  ,ensihie ohjectiYC."  High  rates of cconomie growth. and thus  high  level> of 
L·l1lployment. would naturally I()l!ow. 
1-:. "Tile ,ituation Illay perhal" he compared with the policy managelllentofthe warecollomy. 
III  tlidt l',,,e we have a dominant goal tlut is  ,ol11cwhat like the preseIll goal of a high rate of 
growth.  . The goal j, pursued relentlessly, but thc path is madc smoother ifit can he traversed 
\\ nh Ie" rather than l110rc  inflation" (Klein and Bodkin 196-1. -I2S). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reported that 67.7 percent of respondents believed that the federal gov-
ernment should maintain full employment (Bailey 1964, 9). According 
to Tobi n.  "The central goal of Hansen's crusade had been the federal 
commitment to full employment. ...  More than any other single per-
sun. Hansen created in Washington and beyond the climate of opinion 
and understanding that led to the Employment Act of 1946"  (1976. 34). 
Hansen's battle also involved a "counter-offensive"  against the alleged 
dangers of the pursuit of full employment (Musgrave 1976. 5). 
Hansen was the authorofthe National Resources Planning Board pam-
phlet, Aft!:'r the War-FilII Employment; but in 1943, Congress terminated 
the  board by denying it further funding (Nourse  1953. 64). With Ger-
hard Cohn. he then drafted the first full employment White Paper (Bailey 
1(164.  161 J.  Initially. Hansen (1945a. 1(3) hoped that an improved bill 
wuuld emerge from the congressional debates, but he was in a "dejected 
mood" following the defeat of the original Murray Bill (Bronfenbrenner 
19..J.S. 374, n. 4). In the week that 304 became Public Law. he complained 
that "everything in the original bill except the spending provisions [is 1 
window dressing" (quoted in Bailey 1964,47-48). He bemoaned that the 
section of the first  report that considered the "economic philosophy of 
sustained employment ... could not pass muster as a serious economic 
document. ... It  contains highly dubious comments about the  nature 
of the business cycle which would not command the ascent of competent 
specialists in this field." He concluded that "the Report reveals the enor-
mity of the task. The gaps in our knowledge and in our planning. which 
the  Report discloses. brings home to everyone of us  how shockingly 
unprepared we are tll  carry through the national policy declared in the 
Act'· ( 1947c, 69. 701.  But "the progress that has already been made in 
fi ~cal thinking in  this country will  not stop where this debate left off' 
n  947b. lIS  )IK 
This act also established the Council of Economic Advisers. which 
gave the economics profession both a greater public profIle and a per-
manent relationship with the bureaucracy. I!)  A.  C.  Pigou. in  his Royal 
I S  Other "'If-avow cd 'llpportcr, of  :Vlurra) 's original hill also captured the mood among the 
tt;wclIied revoilltionarie,: "The story of the Employment Act or 1<)46 '"ggests a need for more 
re,pon,ihle p\)liC\'-ma~ing in our nationallegi,lature. It also Sll,:gests that until we nwve in that 
direction. national economic policies will continue to be formulated hy  a kaleidoscopic and 
largely irre'p"mihk inkrplay of ideas.  interests. institutions and indiv'iduals" (Bailev  1964. 
2-1-0,  x.i'!. 
1<),  l:dwin ~"urse. the iirst CEA chairman. wrote of the Employment Act that .. ·the spirit of 
.~(; i, J  phra,e of airmlst hallowed signiiicance in  the book or American patriotism. That was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Economic Society presidential address, concluded that "it is  not likely 
that there will be a market for our produce" (1939,271). But in 1947, the 
president of the AEA declared that, henceforth, the relationship between 
''The Economist and The State" was irrevocably changed:  the  United 
States "can no longer remain complacently aloof behind the oceans, nor 
the economists behind the book stacks ....  lThe CEA] gives the pro-
fession of economists a broad opportunity of rendering greater service 
to the nation and places on them. and on thi~ Association, a correspond-
ingly grave responsibility ....  The Ivory Tower has been conquered by 
events and razed to  the ground. The economist is out in  the open and 
must come to grips with problems of state" (Goldenweiser 1947, I. 12). 
There are a number of echoes of Goldenweiser's address in Hansen's 
ami Slichter's work. The Employment Act was a vague and ambiguous 
document, requiring, as it did, the simultaneous achievement of both an 
undefined, but nevertheless "full" employment, combined with price sta-
bility (Bailey 1964,228-32). Goldenweiser (1947,4) noted that "Com-
munism place,- a period after its dogma, in  fact,  an exclamation point, 
while a question mark is  still discernible at the end of deliberations on 
economic dilemmas by proponents of individual enterprise. This appears 
to give the communist approach the advantage of certainty, and leaves 
capitalism under the apparent handicap of  indecision ....  In this critical 
hour the economist and his Association have a great opportunity and a 
corresponding responsibility" [emphasis addedJ. Reading the works of 
Slichter and Hansen (or Samuelson, Solow, Klein. Modigliani. and To-
hin) there can he  no doubt about the degree of responsibility that these 
economists felt for macroeconomic outcomes. Brilliant economists like 
nothing more than unresolved dilemmas or problem~ (for example, see 
Samuelson 199::,245). Equally, as Klein (1992,185) put it.  "when we 
have learned to harness the computer /lOW for problems that seemed to be 
out of reach sOllie years ago, I have a \varm feeling inside." The simulta-
neous pursuit of full employment and price stability came increasingly to 
he seen as a Delphic ambiguity. It is hardly surprising that an economet-
rically based Phill ips-type relation would later be perceived as a solution 
to the riddle, or dilemma, posed by the Employment Act. 
Year I of our national freedolll. 'The spirit of '46' may by future generations attain. if not equal. 
at k,,,t 'cry great ,ignificance." He abo rellected on the unscrupulous nature of "the economic 
politician a, salc,man "r policics:' concluding that "c,en the best economic politician may 
h"',, to he a bit of a demagoglle to win his chance to be a statesm,IIl"  (195.'.459,20-23). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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With the demand for responsibility on the part of  economists went the 
hope for leadership on the part of statesmen (Goldenweiser 1947,6-9: 
Smithies 1949, 359). Faith in  statesmanship with respect to macroeco-
nomic policy, and in particular with respect to restraining wage inflation, 
was also part of Hansen's (and Keynes's) analysis.2o  Slichter also had, 
al least for a while, faith in statesmanship on the part of both trade union 
leader~ and management ([19471  1961. 253; [19501  1961,376). These 
moral imperatives had a global and apocalyptic dimension: without U.S. 
economic strength, "there is little hope for the future of western civilisa-
tion" (Goldenwei~er 1947,4). 
In  light of the  experiences of the  1960s and  I 970s,  it  is  difficult to 
see these hope" as being anything other than pious. At the time the evi-
dence wa~ mixed. Between Pearl Harbor and V-J  Day, less than 0.0006 
of I  percent of total  U.S. production time had been lost due to strikes 
(Manchester 1973, 400: Slichter 1943a, 74-75). Trade unions honored 
their no-strike pledge, and unauthorized strikers were pressured to return 
to  work (Leiserson  1946, 338).  Between 1948 and  1950. British trade 
unions also accepted the  necessity of wage restraint.  The prohibition 
on strikes in the United Kingdom was not repealed until the 1951  Trade 
Union Congress (Phillips 1958,296-97). In the five years after 1947, less 
than 2 million working days were lost due to strikes in Britain (Roberts 
1957.  1 14). J  n 1962. President Kennedy won an impressive victory for 
the Vvage/pric~ guidelines against an attempt to raise prices by the steel in-
dustry. which enhanced his prestige in foreign affairs (Schlesinger 1967. 
508). 
4. The Onset of the Cold War 
On  :'i  June  1947. General Marshall delivered his famous fifteen-minute 
address at  Harvard University's commencement exercise~ (on the same 
day  a communist coup took place in  Hungary). On  19  June  1947. the 
Kremlin received the invitation to participate in what became known as 
the Marshall Plan. But a compelling economic analy;,is began to dominate 
proceedings in the Kremlin, with Marxist theoretical analysis being used 
to demon;,trate that the postwar period would lead to Western economic 
depression and collapse (Halle  1967,  133).  Appealing to  the authority 
20.  H~1I1'1'~n warned that "the teachers and practitioners of Keynesian monetary doctrines had 
h~lla watch their step lest  it  should turn out that a Frankenstein monster had been let loose" 
'19..j7d.200: 1972.351. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of Stalin-"In order to do away with crises, it  is necessary to do away 
with capitalism"-these oracles concluded that the Employment Acts 
were "radically fallacious. They are based on erroneous theoretical con-
ception'> ... the  method of Keynes is  a theoretical figment,  which is 
u"ed for demagogic ends" (Trachtenberg 1946, 406. 409). In  1946. Eu-
gene Varga. the ex-chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the 
..,hort -lived  1919  Hungarian communist government. published a con-
troversial book that suggested that such a breakdown was not imminent 
(Domar 1950). Varga was dismissed from his positions. and eventually 
wa.~ forced to recant, after having been reminded that he "should know 
from  the history of our Party to what sad consequences the  stubborn 
insistence on one's errors lead..,"  (Ostrovitianov. quoted in Domar 1950, 
151).  Louis Halle concluded that policy in the  Kremlin was predicated 
on the gamble that the West would be unable to recover from the crisis 
of 1946-47 (1907.133). Thu..,  June  1947  marked the point of no  re-
turn with respect to the economic Cold War. On 3 April  194R. President 
Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act, and on  16 April  1948, 
sixteen European nations created the  Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation. In September 1949 the United States lost its nuclear 
monopoly; China .  'fell "  in  1949; in June 1950 the  Korean War began; 
in  Apnl  1951  Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to die in the 
electric chair for allegedly pas"ing atomic secrets to the Russian..,. 
The Marshall  Plan had developed through a ,>uccession of accidents 
(Miall 1961. 7R 1), but by 1948 the atmosphere of  combating communism 
was gathering momentum both in Washington and in the West, and "by a 
"elf-perpetuating dialectic the Cold War grew rapidly in  magnitude and 
intensity" (Halle  1967,  156).  A  Gallup poll in  October  1947 reported 
that 70 percent of Americans believed that  Rus"ia was  determined to 
rule the world (Wittner 197R. 47). By 1948, Slichter was in no doubt that 
"the most important fact about the world today is  the conflict between 
the philosophy of life represented by Russia and the philosophy which 
Western Europe and the United States have inherited from the Greeks 
and the Anglo Saxons ....  Russia is gradually creating a community 
in  which individuals are vassals of the State-a new form of serfdom" 
([ 194X]196L 261-62). 
In his  1949 inaugural address, President Truman sought to mobilize 
economists to design policies that would help prevent the spread of com-
munism in  developing countries. In  1951. the Center for International 
Studie" (CENIS) was established at  MIT.  under the leadership of Walt Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Rostow  and  Max  Millikan  (Lodewijks  199 L  286.  292).  The motives 
behind  its  estahlishment reflected the Cold War conflicts of the  time 
(Rmtow  1984,  240.  259).  It  also.  perhaps.  reflected  a  preference by 
Camhridge economists to contribute  toward the  winning of the Cold 
War through economic policy formulation rather than through participa-
tion in  such institutions as the RAND corporation (Leonard 1991, 271 
n. 9). Hansen's Fiscal Policy Seminars became increasingly preoccupied 
with these international considerations (Salant 1976, 17-19). 
The United States  was  entering a  new  period in its  history.  Nixon 
and  McCarthy had  been swept into office in  the Republican landslide 
of 194A.  "a time of anti-radical hysteria" (Sweezy  1947, (31). By  the 
end of 1948. Poland, Hungary. Romania, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia. and 
East Germany had all  become satellites of the Soviet empire. The cur-
rency reform, leading to the German economic miracle, began in  June 
1948. followed immediately by the first open Cold War trial of strength 
in the Herlin blockade and subsequent airlift. By 1948. postwar euphoria 
had clearly evaporated. and in  August Elizaheth Bentley and Whittaker 
Chambers accused three eminent Harvard graduates. Lauchlin Currie. 
Alger  His~. and Harry Dexter White, of treachery (Manchester  1973, 
459. 493-(4).:1  President Truman was subpoenaed hy the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) in connection with the pursuit 
of White; he  responded by suggesting that "the Committee is more un-
American than the activities it is investigating" (quoted in Donner 196 L 
36). Shortly afterward, the HUAC targeted university textbooks in their 
pursuit of subversive literature. This witch-hunt was inspired by the Na-
tional Council for American Education, which was organized by a noto-
rious anti-Semite. Allen Zoll (Maciver 1955.59-63: Donner 190 L 30). 
A.  1.  Brown (correspondence, 29 March  1994) recalls that discussions 
ahout the Cold War and McCarthy were "my daily diet back at Columbia. 
the latter. especially. growing into a general pre-occupation by the time 
I left for home in June [1950]." 
As Samuelson put it,  "The McCarthy era. in  my judgement. posed a 
serious threat of American fascism ....  I observed at close hand the 
fears and tremblings that the Harvard and MIT authorities experienced. 
and these were the boldest of  the American academic institutions"  ( 1992. 
21  Singer 119514.  296-lJ7) recalled that "trade pc,",imism alone "as often enough to put 
)"U in  the  ',uhversive' category ... those were the days of the Hiss trial and the ivlcCarth) 
cOlllmittee:' I alll grateful to  David Laidler for  pointing out to Ille  that Harvard showed little 
intL'rc~t in  retaining Currie or \Vhile Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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23X:  Friedman 1962,  141-42). In  1949, President Conant was asked by 
the chairman of the commission that drafted the antisubversion legisla-
tion of Maryland to instigate loyalty tests for all Harvard faculty members 
(Maclver 1955,196-97; Conant 1970,561-·79). It would be little more 
than  speculation to  inquire  into  the  thought  proces~es of economists 
such as  Hansen or Slichter (over and above that which is grounded in 
evidence). A full-scale biographical analysis might offer a compelling 
explanation; this article merely seeks to highlight the intertemporal con-
junction of  these themes. But it would be foolish to imagine that the Cold 
War was perceived in Cambridge (or elsewhere) as "a  quarrel in a faraway 
cmllltry between people of whom we know nothing." In  February  1948 
an ex-Harvard economist, Nicholas Gcorgescu-Roegen, and his wife es-
caped execution by stowing their way out of Constantsa Harbor, assisted 
by bribed smugglers. Their return to  Harvard in  July  1948 must have 
made the  Cold War seem unpleasantly real  (Georgescu-Roegen  1992, 
133). 
Ironically. Samuelson's concerns for the postwar health of the Amer-
ican economy were similar to the prognosis provided for Stalin in  the 
Kremlin.  Samuelson (1944a.  I 944b ) predicted that by  1947,  produc-
tion \\ould fall  to  1939 levels, and unemployment would approach 20 
percent. He regarded full employment as the central problem of contem-
pantry  economics; and only after this primary objective had been met 
should other problem'. be addressed. Keynesian policies were essential 
to preserve our "own concepts of democracy and freedom," which was a 
different commodity from "the 'industrial democracy' ...  the Russians 
claim that they have"  (1948a, IS, 588). The theme of ~trengthening the 
American economy to cope with the Russian threat reappears elsewhere 
in the text. 22 
The"e concerns were echoed in a chapter written for a book. the subtitle 
of whIch was A .)·tudy (~fthe Politics and Economics of  High Employment 
withollt inflatioll, edited by Millikan, of MIT's CENIS. Under the head-
22. "Lither we learn to control depre"ion and inflationary b()ol1b better than we did bdore 
World War  II.  or the political  structure or our Society  will  hang  in  jeopardy.  .. If,  as be-
fore  the  war.  America marh time for aIH)ther (kcade. the eoliectiviscd nations of the  world. 
who need have  no kar or the busine" cycle. as  we  know  it.  will  forge  that  much nearer or 
hcyond it"  (l9.+ilb. 393-94). In  the third edition of his texthook Samuebon (19';<;. 709) noted 
that  "perhaps we  should be thankful that the Russian economists have  not  mastered modern 
clcmentary economics: they do not yet  undcrqand the  'neo-chbsical"  synthesis which. 
dearly "emomtrates the ability of resolute free sociNies to dissipate the ancient fear of ma" 
unCfllpll)ymcnt."· Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ing "Full Employment and Our National Security Strength," Samuelson 
(1953, 55) ~tated: 
We  live  in  trouhled times.  Great interest attaches to  the economic 
sinews of war.  Would full  employment increase or decrease our de-
fensive and offensive strength in the next war years') The question of 
our funK-I'llfl military strength-or economic war  potential-i~  closely 
related to the question of  our long-run rate of economic progress .... 
Would mass unemployment help the growth of communism in Amer-
ica aml  lower the  fighting  morale of our armed services and civil-
ian  labor force? Could it contrihute to radical legi!-.lation  having no 
immediate relation to recovery and that would he weakening to our 
productive system? To  some ex1t:nt  the answer to  the  first  of these 
questions, I should suppose must be ye~ ....  I question whether our 
democratic system is quite so fair-weather a flower as some have come 
to regare! it ... the rest of the world's opinions of us and our way of 
life  would be seriously blackened if we were to succumh to  a great 
depression ....  l rndoubtedly our high levels of civilian production 
of steel  and durables in  the  1945-50 post-war period added to  our 
\trength to meet the post-Korean challenge. 
These themes were quite commonly di"cussed in the postwar period. 
During the  war,  a  handful  of economisb had created a  revolution  in 
American policy. The two immediate goals for the postwar period were 
price control and extensive government spending programs. But the Cold 
War had elevated the importance of military expenditures over the claims 
of social welfare programs: "After 1946 the defence program had come, 
not  to  represent.  but  to  conflict with  the  liberal  Keynesian  hopes for 
ahundance. security and progress" (Jones 1972,  130-32: Smithies 1949. 
3(0). At  the same time, it was widely assumed that increased defense 
expenditures would produce inflationary pressures (Smithies 1949,358: 
Reierson 1957,  150,  J 55). 
Richard Gilbert and a group of Harvard and Tufts contributors to the 
Fi"CLtl  Policy Seminars had coauthored a  Hansen-inspired analysis of 
secular :'>tagnation  (Gilbert et al.  1(38).  Later,  in  a  paper delivered to 
the lEe, titled "'Economics for Cold War;' Gilbert suggested that  the 
Rus"ians '"have allocated their resources with devi lish purpose and effect. 
and they have understood the role of incentives and applied them with 
spectacular success." Russian growth rates were believed to be double 
those of the  United States, whose performance "'falls  short of what is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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clearly required for survival." Gilbert concluded that the continuation of 
inflation in the United States "would have the most serious consequences" 
( 1958.230. 221 ~22). Hansen and Slichter also became preoccupied with 
national security issues; but their conclusions about inflation  were the 
opposite of Gilbert's. 
5. Alvin Hansen 
The Keynesian Revolution effected a fundamental redirection of  research 
etlorts,  away from  the  detailed analysis of business cycles,  toward a 
General Tlzeorv of Emp!o)'mellt that  was  also  "capable of explaining 
the phenomena of the Trade Cycle" (Keynes  1936. 313). Hansen was 
as~ociated with this redirection-both as cause and eflect (Seltzer 1946, 
(7). In  his pre-Keynesian period, he regarded each cyclical fluctuation 
as an extremely complex phenomenon that could be analyzed using the 
analogy of a pendulum.23  In  his pre-Keynesian days he had concluded 
that "it is wholly fallacious to assume that a government can, in a private 
capitalist economy, spend its way out of depression" (Hansen and Tout 
19.n, 143). 
Samuelson concluded that  Hansen and others "had gone far  in de-
scribing the business cycle [although) neoclassical economics was hand-
icapped in that it lacked a developed macroeconomics to match its almost 
over-developed microeconomics ....  Fortunately. Hansen did not fol-
low YTitchell's example to move down curves of diminishing returns in 
trying to  let  the  facts  tell  their own story about what sometimes hap-
pen~ in business cycles and what sometimes does not. ...  Hostility to 
economic theory  [is 1 the only sure hadge identifying an  Institutional-
i~t" (1976b, 845;  1976a, 27). In  1931, a visit by  Ragnar Frisch to the 
University of Minnesota had stimulated Hansen's interest in accelerator 
analy~is (Sweezy 1972,  120~21; Hansen and Tout 1933. 120 n. 2). Under 
Mitchell's influence. he had previously been suspicious of business cy-
cle models (Breit and Ransom [197111982.89). Later, Hamen (1941b) 
and Samuelson (1939) combined the accelerator with the multiplier to 
generate a model of the business cycle-illustrated with statistical data 
:'J, Eyuilihrium i, disturhed hy exogenous f()rces. and "disequilihrium resulb from a di,rup-
tlOll  of the internal price structure," A "gently falling:' or (preferahly I a "gently rising" price 
level could reestahlish the equilibrium c("t-price relationship: 'This is the essence of  economic 
slahility"  (Hansen and Tout  1933.  146-47.  120).  Hansen's analysis was usually accompanied 
hy  <lpprupriatc ilbtituti(lnal detail and data analysis (Barher 19X7.  192 I, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from  the American economy (Hansen  194Ib). This became known as 
the Hansen-Samuelson model (Ackley 1961. 496). 
Hansen had previously been thought of as somewhat of an advocate 
of deflation (Harris 1968,320). In the 1920s, he was associated with the 
view  that the fundamental economic difficulty was "society's tendency 
to accumulate capital without saving, thus giving rise  to  inflation fol-
lowed by subsequent collapse" (Musgrave 1976,3). The AEA organized 
a  ~ession on forecasting the behavior of the business cycle, in  spite of 
the  apparent hostility of the  AEA president, Jacob Hollander, to  such 
attempts at  prophecy  (Mitchell  1923,  45).  Hansen's contribution was 
titled "The Outlook for Wages and Employment." Not only does his de-
tailed historical discussion resemble Phillips's (1958); he also discussed 
an  empirically based "employment curve" (Hansen  1923, 38),  He also 
noted, like Phillips, that it was possible for aggregate wages to be sticky 
downward even in  the presence of significant levels of unemployment 
(Hansen  1923,  31;  1925,  40).  But  Hansen employed a  disaggregated 
microeconomic approach, and his conclusions were different from those 
that would subsequently be derived from Phillips curve results: there was, 
he  argued, "a contest of high wages versus full employment.,,2.+ Hansen 
was concerned about the unemployment consequences of labor's wage 
tenacity. For the wage-earner, "An established wage is a front line trench 
which must not be given up at any cost.  ,  , The stage is thus set for an un-
precedented struggle over the existing wage level."  The rise in real wages 
since 1914 had been "nothing short of revolutionary" (1923,39-40,34). 
These themes were also echoed and elaborated in Slichter's work, 
Hansen subsequently became known as "much more than the Ameri-
can Keyne<," (Samuelson 1976a, 25). His after-dinner AEA presidential 
address declared that full employment was the fundamental problem of 
the time (1939,4,12-15): "a challenge is  presented to all those coun-
tries which have not as yet submitted to the yoke of political dictatorship 
2-+,  Harbcn argued that "the abnormally high wage level is likely to remain  _ such a wage 
le\ "I  L""1  ,carcely fail to affect the volume of employment. To be -'lire. if we are to have during 
the ne,t year or so another period of price inflation, the price level may temporarily catch up 
\\ nh the wa"e level. as in  faL't  it  is now in the process of doing, but that will only be a temporary 
,itllation, With the next fall  in  prices, industries will a"ain be confronted with an abnormally 
high  wa"c kvel.  The  inevitable result of such a  situation is  that  a considerable volume of 
llllcmpl,'ymcnt en,ues,  ,[t is a contest ofhi"h wages versus full employment." Any iIlcrease 
in  anempl{»  ment would increase the marginal product of labor: "Thus unemployment makes 
po\sibk higher wages for those employed. or in  other words, abnormally high wage,s cannot 
he raid without a considerable volume of une111ployment" ( 1923,36-37. -+ II Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I  and  J an all round regimented economy." His challenge to the profession 
was to devise a program of public expenditure that would maintain full 
employment while avoiding the vicious spiral of inflation and growing 
inefficiencies. He discussed numerical estimates of the level of national 
income at which governments should begin to be alarmed about the con-
~equences for inflation. and warned that economists and policy makers 
should not ullderstate the dangers imolved.25 
In  I  947. Han~en  updated his challenge to the profession "on the thresh-
old of this great experiment." Full employment, he argued. would still 
leave between 2 and 3 million people temporarily unemployed. He saw 
henefits from  an average unemployment rate of 4 to 5 percent, which 
\vould  provide a  suitable degree of labor market flexibility.  Inflation. 
however. wa" "the immediate danger ... stability, maximum produc-
tioll and full employment are not easily achievable goals. We are perhaps 
out of the kindergarten. but we have a long way to go ....  Inflation now 
will bring devastating collapse later we need to be on our guard. We must 
not play with fire ...  we must have a program of wage and price stabil-
ity.  Full employment programs are loaded with inflationary dangers. To 
deny that would be folly." He also echoed Beveridge's concern with price 
~tability and the necessity for trade unionists to restrain wage demands 
(1947b, 23,19 n.!. 108. vii-viii, 13,57-81. 157). 
But inflation became persistent, and Hansen's judgment about the ad-
verse consequences of inflation appears to have changed. Like the trans-
formation  between  1936 and  1938.  this change occun'ed gradually.  2(, 
In  1941-42. Hmr to  Pa.y jor tIll' War came to Washington, via Harvard. 
2'. Economi'h "'will  not perform their function if they  fail  to disclose the possihle danger 
which lurk.s  in  the wake of vastly enlarged government activities.  public 'pending is the 
,?asie,t of all recovery method"  and therein lies ib danger" I Han'en  IlJ3L),  14-1'i). 
26. He wrote that "'it is of utmost importanct: not to he '0  scaredofintiation as to drive headlong 
Into stdgndti('Il"'  i IlJ.\8.  3 I  L)I.  In  I L)39  he presented a preliminary report on Fi.\ca/  Po/iCl' {llld 
HU'IIlCI'\ (\dn  to a conference of specialists. Hansen reiterated the "conclusion of the  1930<' 
ahout the corre'pondence between "Ameri(,{/Il Prosperi!\' (/1/(/ World  Peace,"  which required 
'hold social engineering,"' He  highlighted a parddox: "Until an appwach to  full  employment 
Is  reached expansion will  help prevent  inflatioll. This is  true  because until  full  employment 
j, reached. the main danger of innation lie, in  the  development of hotticnecb." But  he  also 
cautioned again'i "'dangerow, price inflation as the economy approached full employment. 
intlatioll  is  even  m,lre  serious and insidious than  unemployment. It  will  not do to  let  it  get 
,tarted in  allY  area"'  (194Ih. 44?\-4lJ. 434-35,. Henry Simons, who came "to hury Hansen." 
aekllll\\ ledged "an implicit Hansen principle, namely that inftation should he avoided.  . He 
dearly is dispo"'d to avoid and deplore inflati(ln.  . By implication he i, asking for the 1110't 
expansive liseal policy cOl11patihlc with price stability" (1942, 162.  I SO-S2J. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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There was an "almost paranoiac concern in  1940 and 1941  over inflation 
.  it  wa~ axiomatic that, in  the coming conflict, inflation must, above 
aiL be prevented. It was also axiomatic that to prevent much inflation one 
must prevent a little ....  In early 1941, Alvin Hansen took up the dis-
cussion at Harvard." (Galbraith 1981, 127-28). Hansen's (and Gilbert's) 
.~Iightly heretical proposal was to di~tinguish between localized inflation, 
due to specific shortages or bottlenecks, and a generalized increase in 
all  prices due to a general excess of demand (Galbraith 1981.  129). To-
hin interpreted this episode as opposition to the "premature imposition of 
anti-inflation measures, correctly arguing-not only against conservative 
Americans but against Keynes himself when he visited Washington-
that ~lack in the American economy was still enormous" (1976.36-37). 
The Wartime Keynesians "shifted public attention to the expansionary 
rather than inflationary effects of large deticits" (Jones 1972.  128). To-
ward the end of the war. attention was increasingly devoted to the policy 
analysis of the type of wage and price behavior that would be required to 
achieve and maintain full  employment (S,dant 197(1,  17). But Hansen's 
analysis involved the advocacy of "reasonable prices" and "competitive 
price decreast's": plu" a caution about wage increases "encountering un-
favourable economic repercussions with respect to the cost-price struc-
lun:" (1943. 14.  IY.  20). 
By  1945.  Hansen  was  more  fully  aware of the  inflationary conse-
quences of the pursuit offull employment and he advocated an incomes 
policy (Samuelson  IY76a,  30). He argued that "'a  compensatory fiscal 
program cannot allow expansion to run on into a price inflation": with 
wage inflation "the prospect of economic stability would be very dark 
indeed." But he aho argued that some degree of postwar inflation was 
the only alternative to an upheaval in industrial relations and widespread 
di~pute',: "It would be suicidal to engage in destructive industrial con-
t] iets over the wage question ....  In the fight against inflation. as indeed 
in any public policy. awkward but hard facts intrude and not infrequently 
tlmm: serioLls monkey-wrenches into the machine. Many things simply 
must be  done within reason even though they conflict with the goal of 
price stability ....  Tough facts such as these I  that is. the likelihood of 
inJuqrial disputes I do. indeed strike blows at rigoroLls consistency. The 
reed that does not bend may hreak. B  lind adherence to a doctrinaire and 
inflexible pursuit of mere price stahilitv will not do" (1945b. 260; 1945-
'+6.  6Y.3-94: emphasis added). But "till he advocated "full employment 
at a substantially stahle price level" ( 1946a, 72). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In  1947. he discounted the "alleged dilemma" of accepting 6 to 8 mil-
lion unemployed as the inevitahle cost of stable prices. His analysis of 
inflation was. at this time, constructed in microeconomic terms. Hansen 
detected a change in Keynes's priorities between 1936 and 1939. Previ-
ously,  Keynes had assumed that cost curves were  U shaped.  By  1939, 
Keyne" concluded that cost curves might  be  flatter than  he  had hith-
erto supposed. Hansen cited empirical evidence that concluded that cost 
cur\e~ might  be  horizontal over large  ranges of output, the  U-shaped 
proposition being no more than a bias in economic theory. without em-
pirical support. Full employment was, therefore, inherently compatible 
with price stability. Wage inflation was not an  inevitable "flaw" under 
full  employment capitalism, but "a problem of lahor management re-
lations and collective bargaining" ( 1947a, 560-61 )Y By  1949, Hansen 
helieved that it  was "now widely held'· that cost curves were substan-
tially horizontal over large ranges of output, and that real wages might 
actually rise as employment increased. In the absence of a war-induced 
inflation, "the system is, within limits, internally and inherently stable." 
But Hansen restated his opposition to ongoing inflation: too rapid an in-
crease in prices "may be highly dangerous to the continued stability and 
social cohesiveness of a democratic society"· (1949, 120-21, 155. 129). 
In  1949, Hansen stated that "as full employment is approached. prices 
may tend to  rise more rapidly than employment:· Hansen introduced a 
concept that he called "the price elasticity of  output as a whole at different 
leveb of output:· This elasticity was conditioned. in part by "bottleneck 
situations:' although Hansen thought that "Keyne~ was perhaps inclined 
to  owr:;tress their importance" (1949,  133-34). These bottleneck situ-
ations could be broken by a variety of policy actions. It is  tempting to 
see in this analysis an optimistic forerunner of the Phillips relation that 
would dominate New Frontier thinking about the relationship between 
full  employment and inflation.  In  the  1960s,  zero inflation  was ahan-
doned as  a policy goal; the  1950s can be seen as  a transitional period 
with respect to these changing views of inflation. During the  1950s, an 
increasing number of economists became attracted to the view that full 
employment policies should be pursued, even if this implied ongoing in-
27.  In the tran,itinnal period, prior to full employment. lahor would have to choose hetv.ccn 
ahnormally high proflts or high levels of unemployment. When expectations adjusted to  con~ 
tinuing rull  employment, entry of new  IIrms and movement, along:  long·run cost curves "will 
tend to put downward pre"ure on marginal co,t"  price, and output" (Hamcn 1947a. 559-64: 
Slichter 1945aL Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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flation. Thomas Balogh and the United Nations Report on Full Employ-
ment advocated  thi~ view. "Hansen's theory" stated that full employment 
was incompatible with price or wage stability, and that an unacceptably 
large volume of  unemployment was required to prevent inflation (Wagner 
1957,87-90). 
By  1952. Hansen's contributions to the Fiscal Policy Seminar were re-
garded, by some, as rather "cut and dried" (Salant 1976,21). Although he 
was four years away from retirement, he was already sixty-five years old. 
During a visit to Berkeley in the early I 950s, Hansen invited John Letiche 
to otfer some criticisms of his work. Letiche replied that Hansen seemed 
to  be  repeating himself in  his work on employment theory. Hansen re-
torted. "you're right and I intend to do something about it" (quoted in 
Breit and  Ransom  1971,  105  n.  50).  He  began  to espouse the  social 
imbalance hypothesis, which Galbraith popularized (Samuelson 1976b, 
849). The postwar episode had demonstrated "how vast a volume of ag-
gregate demand is  necessary to keep the ... American economy fully 
employed" (Hansen 1951,508). He also concluded that "Keynesian crit-
ic"  may.  however,  have exaggerated the danger of inflation and wage 
control in a full-employment society" (1953, 229). In  1954, he advised 
the  Joint Committee on  the Economic Report that fears of peacetime 
inflation were "grossly exaggerated" (quoted in Gordon  1975.  101). In 
1957, he concluded that the previous quarter-century had provided a lab-
oratory experiment with which to test the validity of Keynesian policies 
(1972.33). The  U.S.  economy was  equipped with safeguards against 
peacetime inflation; the remaining problem of wage inflation could be 
"olved by ''statesmanlike action"; the "fetish of rigid price stability is an 
obstacle to growth" (1972, 35).2X  Unless aggregate demand was used to 
generate full  employment, "we shall not even discover what our poten-
tialities for growth are.  Under these circumstances we could gradually 
drift into a condition of stagnation"  (1972,36-39). Hansen also forcibly 
~X. To ,urrort his argumcnt. Hansen ( 1972. ,16) cited the work of Frcderick Milb. of the 
NBER. whose analysis nf periods of expansion ovcr an eighty ycar pcriod "showed that. 
for ever)  I  per cent. increa,e in  output we have had Hfi 0  per cent.  increase in  rrices~a 5 
to 4  rutin." InAation needed to he redcfined as "a condition in  which rrices rise without any 
apprcciahk incrc<1.,c  in  output.  one docs not encounter the condition of inflation in any 
meaningful scn  ... c so Ion!!  a~ percentage increa~e" in aggregate output exceed by sonle ll1argin 
the percentage increases in  the price leveL  . There are time, when a tremendous forward 
pu,h is  urgently needed. when a choice has to he  made hetween permitting a price increase 
,urstanlially greater than my rule suggests or ebe forgoing the needed increase in aggregate 
output." Rapid growth. Han,en argued. was normally associated with moderate inflation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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argued for an  increase in government expenditure (1960b, 67:  Slichter 
1961,  142).2') 
In these autumn 1959 Phillips Lectures, Hansen (aged seventy-three) 
argued that the postwar average unemployment rate of 5.1  percent was 
"intolerably high"  (1960b, iv). Given the timing, it seems likely that he 
had access to the "Samuelson-Solow schedule" prior to the  1959 AEA 
meeting (1960b, 4). In earlier time periods, 
the word "inflation" was virtually unknown. Words, phrases, playa not 
inconsiderable role in popular psychology. You cannot frighten people 
out of their boots with the phrase "high cost of living." ...  "Inflation" 
implies that something is ahout to blow up.  And in  fact,  much of the 
current discussion partakes. I fear, of something unpleasantly akin to 
hy~teria.  .  .  . We  should stop trying to scare the wits out of people 
about the  inflation issue.  Fortunately the  public puts little  stock in 
this alarmist talk about the "tinder of inflation lying all about us." The 
inflation problem can be made, and is being made, into a powerful pro-
paganda argument against increases in government expenditures .... 
It is  high time that we modernised our system of built-in stabilizers. 
Until we do this, we  shall not escape the bugaboo of inflation every 
time we begin to approach full utilisation. We need inflation-resisting 
cushions to make us  bolder in  our programs of expansion. (Hansen 
1960b, 25. 31, 23,66) 
The urgency of Hansen's tone was due to "The Soviet Economic Chal-
lenge" ( I 960b. 43-68). Soviet annual industrial growth rates. he believed, 
had been 10 percent, compared with 3.5 to 4 percent in the United States. 
The "growing authority of Soviet science and technology" was attributed 
to generous allocations of funds: 
It must become clearer day by day to any reasonable observer of the 
American  scene that the  marginal  tax  dollar has currently  a  much 
higher social utility than the marginal pay-envelope dollar.  The for-
mer goes into schools; the latter into tail fins ....  Basically the matter 
simmers down to this:  under currently dominant political tenets, the 
Federal government is not permitted to play the role which is requisite 
for adequate growth.  .  .  in  order to measure up  to the  production 
29. Slichter ath is"d the Senate Finance Committee that "in addition to stepping up spending 
In the lTlll1lcdiatL' future as much a~ po-;sih1e. Il1pderatcly large longtcrnl incred~es in  spending 
should abo he planned" ([ 1958a[  1961.  UO). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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requirements imposed upon  us  by  the Cold War.  It  cannot be  done 
by purely conventional methods ....  National defence is indeed [he 
supreme i"sue confronting us. On one matter at least there is no con-
trover:.-y  among economists. No economist. to my knowledge. ques-
tions the economic capacity of the  United States to provide adequate 
defence ....  Up to the  First World War the gold standard and  the 
balanced budget were sacrosanct. The gold standard is gone. but the 
balanced-budget dogma has enjoyed of late  a considerable revival. 
And linked with it.  as a substitute for the gold standard, is  a newly 
born dogma-already a  lusty  inf~ll1t-the dogma of price  stability. 
The dogma has become in recent years a major weapon to beat down 
gmernment expenditures. ( I 960b. 43, 47, 24, 44-45, 5-6) 
Hansen mentioned only one of the  1960 U.S. presidential candidates: 
"The Nixon cabinet committee. on price stability and growth ... noted 
...  that if prices are not to fall in recession periods, they must be nipped 
in the bud in periods of  expansion. This. however. is easier said than done. 
and at any rate it raises the very serious question whether really vigilant 
pnce policing would not also nip expansion in the bud ....  It is shock-
ing tn hear high Administration officials declare that we cannot afj(m1 
adequate defence. education. housing, urban renewal etc ....  Instead 
of giving m  a vigorous positive leadership they are spreading a fear psy-
chology throughout this country by  alarmist talk about inflation."  But 
there is a not-too-mysterious reference to the U.S. presidential candidate 
most closely aligned with Cambridge thinking: "What is  needed is  not 
the banker's mentality of caution, but rather the entrepreneurial spirit of 
adventure. of bold experimentation. I leave it to the reader to see if he 
can scan on the horizon that kind of leadership"  (1960b. 22-23. 185,39). 
6. Sumner Slichter 
Slichter was  widely regarded  as  a  highly  influential  economist.  with 
uncanny  foreca:-.ting  ability  and  unrivaled  perceptiveness  about  trade 
union~ (Dunlop  1%1. xxi;  Samuelson  1961.24: Haoerler  1961.  25). 
He  wa~ also the author (1937) of one of the most influential studies of 
the L.S. interwar business cycle (Gordon 1949,55: Haberler 1949.87). 
He became a leading advocate of the wage-push explanation of inflation 
(Haberler 196 I. 21  ).  He was also the chairman of the AEA Committee 
Oil Public bsues (Slichter 1949a;  1950b), which published the influen-Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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tial subcommittee report on economic instability ( 1950b). His devotion 
to  labor-management relations  and their macroeconomic implications 
lasted virtually until the day of his death, when despite his painful and 
crippling illness he managed, in his hospital room. to put the final touches 
to Tl1I' Impact ot'Collective Batp,aining UPO/l Management (Mason 1961, 
182-83). 
Slichter's AEA presidential speech (1942). delivered a few weeks after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, addressed the same issues that would 
later concern the New Frontier economists--"The Conditions of Expan-
sion."  High postwar levels of employment required a change in policies. 
in-.titutions.  and trade union attitudes. if such  pursuits were  not to  be 
di ~sipated in  inflation. Slichter supported Roosevelt\, 1942 wage stabi-
lization program. and he  advocated that workers who posed a threat to 
the national wage policy be enlisted into the armed forces (1944b. 38-39; 
I  944a. 41-42). He was optimistic about postwar employment prospects. 
"if the control of prices during the war and immediately after is  rea-
sonably effective" (I943b. 252). In  1946. he  concluded that "the main 
protection of  the country against inflation is the people themselves-their 
willingness to wait for goods and their resistance to sizeable increases in 
prices. If the mood of the people were to change. inflation would quickly 
be upon us" ( 1946b, 62). Tn  an article titled "Prices Must Come Down;' 
he  argued in  favor of "the development of an  inllationary psychology  . 
.  .  . The most dangerous aspect of the business situation is the rapid rise 
in wholesale prices" (1947c. 7,71). But. as I argue below. his subsequent 
analysis was significantly different. Now there was an urgency prompted 
by Cold War considerations (! 1954] 1961,403). Ultimately. if employer 
re"istance weakened and the public did not insist on wage restraint, then 
inflation  would  have  to  be tolerated ([1954]  1961. 404-5:  1958.292; 
[1959b]1961,43Il. 
Murray's original Full Employment Bill stated that full  employment 
in tht'  United States was essential for international peace. If. and appar-
ently only if. the estimated expenditures exceeded the full employment 
target. then the president should step in  to prevent inflationary disloca-
tions. or reduce expenditures. or both (Bailey 1964.244-46). But Slichter 
opposed the Murray Bill on anti-inflationary grounds (1945a.  111-12; 
I  946a. 313).  Deficit spending would have  little favorable  influence on 
the  \olume of structural  unemployment. and  would  be  of little  as~is­
tance to the least efficient workers-those in "the twilight zone between 
employable and unemployable" ( I 946a. 316). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Two interrelated themes dominated Slichter's writing prior to the Cold 
War. The first theme was a recognition that economic power had  ~hifted 
toward organized labor ([1920]  1961  167:  [1939]  1961,215). This re-
quired a  new sense of responsibility on the  part of trade  union  lead-
ers, causing unions to become quasi-public organizations ( 1943b. 258). 
The second theme was the necessity of achieving high industrial morale 
([1920J  1961.  167-83: [1929]  1961.184-212). In  1940, Slichter took 
~)\er the  leadership of the Trade Union Fellowship Project at Harvard, 
which was devoted to the education of trade union leaders (1961, xiii). 
He also devoted an enormous amount of  time to industrial relations field-
work.  Slichter. like  many other economists writing in the interwar pe-
riod,  was concerned that the fall  in  prices had not been matched by a 
corresponding fall  in  nominal wages (which he attributed to timidity on 
the  part of employers, with respect to  the  prospect of radicalism  and 
~trikes). This raised the prospect of serious and chronic unemployment 
([ 1932J  196 L 304). Slichter nevertheless drew a characteristically op-
timistic conclusion:  "One course remained-to increase efficiency by 
developing a stable force  and by winning the good will and coopera-
tion  of the  men.  This alternative  was  widely adopted"  ([ 1929]  196 L 
1  X9-212). Collective bargaining had revolutionized the labor market-
"employment must adjust itself to the price of labor rather than the price 
of labor to employment"-but the resulting unemployment was caused 
by "the tendency of many trade unions to underestimate the elasticity in 
the demand for labor.·' Fortunately, this could tend to accelerate research 
and technological change. Slichter was aware that a certain amount of 
wage flexibility--especially in a downward direction-was required to 
prevent unemployment, and that "industrial democracy. if unwisely op-
erated. may  threaten the existence of political democracy,"  It was fear 
of social conflict that led him to  advocate economic expansion (! 1939 J 
1961,218-19.223-24.232). He became alarmed by pmtwar social con-
flict ( 1945c. 207:  1943a, 74). which in  1946 manifested itself in a series 
of massive strikes  in  the United States, involving more than  5 million 
\vnrkers. The coal.~trike was dramatically settled five minutes after Pres-
ident Truman began a speech to Congress asking for authority to draft 
into the  armed forces  all  striking workers.  Nevertheless,  107,476.000 
v.orking days were lost due to strikes in that year (Willner 1978,  18-19: 
lVlanchester 1973,400.402). 
Macroeconomic  policy since  1960 cannot adequately be  described 
without reference to the various negatively sloped curves that have been Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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impos~d on intlation-unemployment data.  It seems probable that there 
was another curve lurking behind the policy disputes of the immediate 
postwar period:  the  strongly positively sloped curve tracing the  mete-
oric increase in trade union membership. from around 10 percent of the 
Lniled States workforce at  th~ start of the  New  Deal, to more than 35 
percent of th~ workforce in the late  1940s.;o  incr~asing sixfold in  the 
quarter-century prior to Phillips's seminal paper, from 3 million in  1933 
to  14.5 million in  1945 (Slichter 1958,54; 1945c. 207). During the war, 
a "majority" of professional labor economists were engaged in wage set-
ting and labor-management arrangements. Many became dismayed by 
the irrelevance of orthodox wage theory and the lack of detailed infor-
mation about this crucial area (Hopkins  1947,719-20).31 Slichter saw 
his work as correcting the misinformation on which previou:-, theory had 
been hased (1947a). He emphasized that "most unions believe that their 
principal aim after the war will be fighting deflation and unemployment. 
Some of them are accumulating funds for fighting wage cuts ....  The 
political policies of organised labor during the first  two or three years 
after the war are likely to affect the stability of the economy even more 
than its economic policies ....  It is not unrealistic to conclude that the 
halance of  pow~r  in the struggle over the prevention of inflation after the 
war will be held by organised labor" ( 1943b. 243-47). But "the achieve-
m~nt  of  effectiv~ cooperation between organised groups will be the great 
ta"k of the twentieth century. The war, by compelling men to put national 
inter~st~ first.  may help them to learn new social skills and to discover 
how to  limit the area of conflict and to enlarge the area of cooperation. 
Should this happen on a substantial scale. the rise in the standard of living 
after the war would be breathtaking" (1943a, 82). 
Like other economists, Slichter became preoccupied with national se-
curity  issues. but his conclusions about inflation were the  opposite of 
Gilbert's. The Korean War would raise the price level by  10 to 20 per-
cent, which might prevent the maintenance of high employment (1950e. 
In. LU!/Iml/i.ll,  1')··2'; Fehruary  199-1,2-1.  In  19.B. trade unions in  the United States I'.crt' 
"of relati\cJy littie importance" (Hansen and TOllt 19:13.  1-161. 
.l i. "Exploration of the relation of \,ages and prices to employment cannot fail  to impress 
1m,'  wilh the deplorahle stalc of emplo) ment theory ....  Nobody know,s  how this Inew kind 
"I' economy i I'. i  I  I I'."rk and how wages and prices in  it I'. ill  beha\ c" (Slichter 19-16a. :; I 6-I 71. 
Ri,'hard Lester began an assault on "the mental ruts"  of marginal productivity thinking, as part 
of  this reexamination of lahor economics orthodoxy 11947.  I-IX).  A.  M.  Ros, concluded that 
·'the inlluencc:.. L1dcrmining wages run  in  political rather than geographical or industrial orhits" 
(!L).+7a.  X~2). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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24,7). But the title of this article was "We Can Win the Economic 'Cold 
War' Too."  The chief economic misconception of the time was "the as-
~crtion that preventing inflation is  the country's number one problem." 
An enormous increase in output was necessary to 
prevent Communist aggression  .  .  .  the  policies necessary to keep 
prices  stable  would  severely  handicap  the  United States  in  an  ef-
fort to contain Communism by building up the economies of the free 
world..  . A :;table price level. or the conditions that accompany it. 
could handicap the United States in its effort to unite the free nations 
of the world against Communism and to make these nations prosper 
~o that Communism cannot flourish within their borders .... From 
the standpoint of the rest of the world. a slowly rising price level in the 
United States is greatly to be desired. Certainly it would promote the 
success of our foreign policy ....  The new economic competition 
from Russia promises to benefit the United States by compelling the 
country to re-evaluate its economic policies and to pay more attention 
to economic growth and less attention to a stable price level. (1950c, 
.II;  1952a.53~55; 1961,403,  161~62, 150) 
Thus, in the Cold War period. economists who were concerned to effect 
full employment. and to defeat communism, came to the judgment that 
inflation would be helpful to these objectives; the battle against inflation 
might reduce employment and thus weaken the fight against communism 
(Slichter 1195211961. 107).32 
Slichter concluded that creeping inflation was one of  the consequences 
of converting the "defense economy'" into the "war economy." But infla-
tion would be accompanied by high employment and output. and a higher 
standard of living ( 1951 a,  29, 77;  1951 c, 33;  1952b, 39).  In  an  article 
titled ""How  Bad Is  InflationT he stated. "At the risk of being called an 
irrespon~ible and dangerous thinker. let me say that in the kind of econ-
12.  In tUIl):;  ,)1" the Iransitil>nal period of Slichtcr\ till'ught. he  noted in  Fehruary  IlJ4X  that 
(hue had been a 50 percent rise in wholesale prices in the previous tWll  years, yet cmpluyment 
levc!.s had heen high I [ 1948a  I  1961.93). Slichtcr \\ as alse) an advocate of  delicit spcnding~and 
rCf:ardcd hudget surpluses as. potentially. a majllrdeflationary influence (lJO). He was aware that 
the rise  in  indehtedness had heen outstripped hv  the risc  in  nominal national product ([ 19521 
19(> 1.  9X-99).  [ntlation tends to  reduce the real  hurden of federal  deht (Sliehtn  1950c. 24: 
Samuelson  19.:11.29 n.  2:  :Ykade  IlJSS.  h: Harris  1943.  16lJ-85.  1941.  But in[iation-induced 
hLls·kel  creep al,,) tends to increase taxes I  Slichter  [947h.  [2. h 71.  Slichter argued that inOa-
ti,w "ould sevLTcly  reduce the price of fixed-illcolTle  securities: 'The reperClhsions upon the 
c(i)llomy  \-.... ould he enormou  .... '· (19-l-7h. 6X). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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omy pos~essed  by the United States. a slowly rising price level is actually 
preferable to a stable price level. The reason for this conclusion is that the 
maintenance of a stable price level would conflict with other important 
interests of the country." There was a potential trade-off hetween zero 
inflation and other desirable goals: "Whilst a modest rate of inflation of 
two or three per cent. per year was hardly enough to be noticed at any 
given moment. [itl is sufficient to cause suhstantial injustice ... more 
than offsetting these injustices. however, will be the avoidance of unem-
ployment that is necessary in order to keep prices stable ....  And in the 
divided world of today, in  which every recession in  business gives op-
portunities for Communist activity. it is imperative that the United States 
avoids severe or even moderate recessions" (l952a, 53, 57. 54). Slichter 
also argued that increasing imports into the United States (which would 
be  a~sociated with creeping inflation) must become the cornerstone of 
American foreign policy in its struggle with world communism (1952a, 
56: for the strategy of increasing imports as  an anti-inflationary device 
see Lerner 1948. 25-26). 
Slichter wrote two brief memorandums about his life and work. which 
he  left,  pre~umably for posterity, in  his files.  Under the subtitle "Some 
Positions 1 Have Taken,"  Slichter prophetically listed "the view that there 
i~ a conflict between maximum employment and keeping prices stable" 
(1961. xv). Stichter directed his readers to the article "How Bad Is Infla-
tion')" which illustrated this position. By 1952, Slichter was clearly an 
opponent of stable prices. Twenty year~ earlier. he had outlined the rea-
sons why inflation was undesirable as an ongoing policy n  1932]  1961, 
313).  In  1950. his  statistical analysis of interwar U.S.  data led him to 
propose a small but negative correlation between increases of employ-
men! and average hourly earnings ([1950]  1961. 376-77;  1945c. 221: 
I  946a, 308: [1948aI1961. 90; [194211961. 85: [1929]1961. 186-87). 
Yet  hy  1952.  Slichter's statistical  analysis of inflation-output data led 
him to propose a negatively shaped relation between unemployment and 
inflation. for the years 1889-1950 ([1952J 1961.96-97). 
In  one of his  last papers, Slichter argued that inflation  had become 
endemic;  but  that  it  was  diminishing  ([1959al  1961.  134-35;  1959c, 
61)).  Creeping  inflation  was  unlikely  to  break into  a  gallop  ([ 1959al 
1961.  146;  1952a, 56-57). He predicted that public  revulsion against 
both trade union power and rapid wage inflation would tend to diminish 
the tendency of wages to outrun productivity ([ 1958]  1961.  133). Infla-
tion. however, was '"far less important than the problem of 4.4 million Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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unemployed ....  A rising price level  (inflation,  if you  will) is  likely 
to be  a  ~ign of vigorous economic health,  of an economy possessing 
great capacity to develop new investment opportunities"  ([ 1959aJ  1961, 
149, 142). His caulial explanation for inflation ran from technological re-
search, leading to higher profits, which led to ambitious wage demands, 
which were acceded to in the interests of industrial peace ( 1959c). The 
"fetish"  of a stable price level was, therefore, a constraint on expansion-
ist policies. These policies would be accompanied by creeping inflation. 
but this would strengthen the dollar ([ 1959a  1  1961, 148; in contrast, see 
Slichter 1951 b,  109-10). In one of his last papers, "'Inflation-A Prob-
lem of Shrinking Importance," Slichter noted that 1948 was a "dividing 
year" with respect to  explanations of inflation ([1959a]  1961,  136)." 
Around thi .  .,  time,  Slichter, like  Hansen. came to see the battle against 
inflation as too expensive in terms of employment, and hence regarded 
inflation as something that would purchase benefits on this front. 34 
Slichter'~ devotion to the cause of freedom. individualism, and satis-
factory labor market outcomes is impressive (see, for example. 1961. 13; 
1943a. 78).  Yet he increasingly felt that it had been a mistake to permit 
"the Juggernaut of industrial revolution to run wild" during the previous 
two centuries (1961. 315). Labor market corporatism was the conces-
sion that would enable the other values to flourish. He was delighted that 
more Americans felt "the sense of belonging" (1961.  17).  Initially. he 
had faith  that a vigorous trade union movement would exert a healthy 
13.  "llJ4X  may  be  regarded  as  a  dividing year in  the  post war economic hbtory  of the 
l'nited States.  .. Explanations of inflation that are  valid for a  period when the  economy 
was becoming more liquid. are not necessarily valid for a period during which the economy 
wa, losing liquidity. Hence. though inflation up to about  llJ48 can be explained in  large part 
hy  the  increast'  in  the  money supply, that explanation  is  not satisfactory for the SUbsequent 
period" (lllJ5g I lLJ61.  1:10 J.  Slichter supervised Rita Ricardo-Camphell's research on postwar 
economic conditions, until  her departure from Harvard in  ILJ46.  Dr.  Ricardo-Camphell has 
inf'>rrned  me that during this period she heard nothing from Slichter that indicated a dep~rture 
from Lero-intlation advocacy (correspondence. 14 August 1995). 
34. Slichter had a Iifeh'ng fascination with the potential of  science and technology. which was, 
oj course. a signilicant component of institutionalist thought. Upward pressure on wages could 
be  lhd"ul  if it  stimulated technological research, thus ofTsetting  wage-push inflation (1945c. 
221:  IlJ46a,  312).  He  was most gratified by  the sevenfold increase  in  research expenditures 
hetween  ]LJ30  and 1947: "Technological research has. of course. been enormously stimulated 
h,  the Korean War. the defence program and the keen military competition ",ith Russia." This 
rescarch activity also tended to stabilize the economy. "because it  put the demand for goods 
to  J  greater extent than ever before within the control pf industry." The prospect of a drop in 
ddense spending. leading to a recession, "would have far-reaching consequences throughout 
the world and would be a serious setback to our foreign policy" (lllJ521  IlJ61.  105-7  J. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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influence (1961, 315): later, under the influence of the perceived Soviet 
threat, his disillusionment with excessive union power led him to another 
concession-the toleration of ongoing inflation: "Collective bargaining 
... is too well established and produces too many important benefits to 
be disturbed simply because it produces creeping inflation" (1959a, 69). 
Besides, price stability would not halt cost-push pressures originating 
from trade union power (l95Ic, 33). 
With the onset of the Cold War, Slichter emphasized that "the problem 
of a wise price policy is complicated by the rise of powerful trade unions 
in recent years .... In this great conflict between two philosophies the 
trade  unions  are  an  important ally of the  West.  .  .  . They have  been 
a major contributor towards implementing the philosophy of the West." 
The rapid rise to power of  trade unions, especially since the New Deal era, 
had necessitated major changes in economic and political arrangements: 
"It means that the United States is gradually shifting from a capitalistic 
community to a laboristic one." The future of  civilization depended on the 
behavior of Trade Unions in a Free Society: "Although the difficulties are 
formidable, the stakes are immense. The success or lack of success of the 
community in  bringing about appropriate internal  change~ in the labor 
movement and in  developing appropriate public policies towards trade 
unions will determine whether unions become powerful instruments for 
realising the philosophy of freedom or whether they become a new and 
formidable threat to freedom"  (1952a, 54; [ 1948b ]1961,262.255: [1947] 
1961.254). 
Slichter had always been optimistic about the tendency of "conserva-
tive unionism" to act as a "bulwark against irresponsible and dangerous 
groups" and "shallow demagogues"  ([1929]  1961,  187;  [1947]1961, 
236:  1943b, 261). He believed that trade unions were the  most power-
ful  economic organizations in  the community with sufficient political 
clout to  influence election results. and with sufficient industrial muscle 
to confront the  largest corporations (1947a, 4.14; I 945c, 207:  1947b. 
12).  He  drew optimistic inferences from the statements of leaders from 
the American Federation of Labor concerning the pursuit of common 
interests; and he hoped that trade unionists would be compelled "to con-
sider the stake which they have in  the supply and vigour of enterprise in 
the community" ([ 1947 J 1961, 253). He repeatedly argued that to avoid 
inflation common interests should prevail over the special interests of 
a  particular trade  union  body (242).  Strong public  hostility to strikes 
was an important restraint on wage increases (1944a, 35-36). Yet wage-
push inflation had become endemic. and by  1947 the government had Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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\\ ithdrawn its  national wage policy (Ross 1947a. 811). As exhortation 
and moral suasion appeared less likely to produce stable prices, Slichter 
(i ISJ59aj1961, 14L  1957c, 22) relented on his anti-inflation stance: "I 
am pes~imistic about the possibility of halting creeping inflation because 
I am optimistic concerning the prospects of the economy and its capac-
ity to grow ... creeping inflation may be regarded as part of the price 
that we must pay for confidence and satisfaction with [our democratic] 
institutions:"5 
There were two additional transformations in Slichter's approach. In 
1<)47. he stated that trade unions had a choice between fighting over the 
division of a small national income or cooperating to increase that in-
come ([1947) 1961. 242). Yet, in a Brookings Institution lecture, he also 
concluded that the selling of labor through monopolies had effected a 
historic structural transformation of capitalism by "giving the economy 
substantial new capacity to generate money incomes." Thus, trade union 
power shielded the economy from  temporary contractions. Monopoly 
trade union power also,  however,  reinforced the  inflationary tendency 
in  periods of boom. The American economy was now characterized by 
"mutual exploitation," the  fruits  of which "are so widely distributed." 
Prophetically. Slichter believed that there should be "considerably more 
thorough investigation of the economic consequences of labor monopo-
liel., than economic theory has thus far provided.  .  .  . It reljuires radical 
changes in our conception of trade unions and drastic rewriting of wage 
theory and employment theory ....  Widely accepted beliefs concern-
ing the alleged bad effects of wage increases upon employment must be 
abandoned." Wage increases below full employment, he believed, tended 
to  increase output ([  I  959b I 1961. 420. 427, 416, 410. 425; in contrast, 
~ee 1947b. 67). 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Included in Slichter'" lecture to the Brookings Institution are two method-
ulogical statements. Slichter had been a lifelong devotee of data and sta-
tistical analysis. "the last step in the production of knowledge" (Stichter 
J'i. Slidllel had al",,>, heen skeptical ab(lut  the motives of politicians [for example. ,ce 
Sllehter.  19-+(,;t ..  '  I X  I,  and toward the end of his  life  he  began to advocate an  alta,'k on the 
CC'ollOll1ic  pm' er of trade union, ([ 19)9al 1961. 143-4-+; 1959a. (7). Trade unions had courted 
I'[,hlic  dl,iliusi"llmcnt hy  railing  tll  hecome imtruments of industrial democracy (195X).  He 
al,u he,'amc cOl1cern"d "hout class conflict (119)<)al  190 I.  14-+ I. which ran diredly counter to 
hi, ,ocial ph;"""ph). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I 949b, 26).  Yet Dunlop noted that he was "distrustful offoonal models 
and closed systems in  theoretical or econometric terms"  (1961, xix).'h 
There was no shortage of illustrative data in  Slichter's writing, but the 
reference to "rigorous statistical proof" ([1959b  1 1961, 426) appears to 
be  unusual.17  So too  is  the  reference to  "a valuable paper," delivered 
to the Econometric Society (420 n.  3).'X  Likewi~e, he informed a tele-
vision audience in  February 1959 that 3 percent unemployment should 
be  targeted, and that annual inflation of up to 5 percent was below the 
galloping threshold (I  959b, 106). These may be no more than straws in 
the wind with respect to changing fashions in economic discourse. How-
ever. Sumner Slichter died on 26 September 1959, and three months later 
two other Cambridge economists, Paul  Samuelson and Robert Solow, 
launched the Phillips curve estimation industry. which, based on econo-
metric evidence, appeared to suggest that ongoing inflation would pur-
chase sustainable reductions in unemployment.w 
With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that inflation in the  I 960s and 
1970s did all  the things to the economy that  Keynes and Phillips pre-
dicted it would. Liberation "from traditional shibboleths" to achieve full 
employment and "stability through inflation" (Vickery  1955,89-122) 
proved to be unconducive to either stability or liberation.-+{I  As  Keynes 
put it. in another context, "1 only wish to warn you that the chaining up of 
one devil may, if we are careless, only serve to loose another still fiercer 
and more intractable"  (1973, 133). The Faustian pact with the "inflation 
dragon" (Lerner 1967, 3) turned out to be not so easy to reverse. Peter 
36. Hansen had almost nothing to do withcconomctrics I Breit and Ransom 1971.89 n.  14). He 
ab,) warned that "the statistical relatiOlhhip between.  . variables tells Us  absolutely nothing 
ahout cilusal relations. Correlations of stalistical series only pose rroblems" I I 960h. ]()). 
n. "Rigorous statistical  proof of thiS  prorosition cannot be  given. but the ligures for the 
reL'cssion of 1955. though less than comrIcte proof. are convincing" (Slichter [1959b[  1961. 
..(2()-27t. 
'H.  "A  valuahle parer dealing with Ihe  income-creating aspects 01  higher wage, was pre-
'cnted at the American Econometric Society in December I  95X  by Jaroslav Vanek of Harvard 
Crmcr.sity" (Slichtcr [1959b[ 1961. 420). 
39. (,ottfried HabcrIcr wrote. "During the last great debate on inflation in the 1950s. the latc 
Sumner II.  Shchter took the po,ition thaL  we ha\·e to resign llurseive, to creeping inflation of 
ahl'm .- rer cent. a year.  . Recently. Slichter\ theory of permanenl but harmless inflation 
has heen rcvi\ed. provided with new up-to-date econometric foundations and redecorated with 
Phillips curves. cxpectational analyses and cost henetit computations and what not.  \Vherea, 
Slichtcr spoke n]()ucstly of 3 per cent. inflation. the new inflationists speak of 5 per cent. and 
mention flO  upper limit" (1972.  135). 
-lO.  William Vickery's chapLer was published III a volume titled Posi-Kemesi,,!/ Ecollomics. 
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Wiles ( 1973,  377, 379), in  an  article  "born of shame." bemoaned the 
"'Latin Americanisation of the world ...  cost inflation at a high rate has 
produced a 'general crisis of capitalism' and the stability of Communist 
prices shines like a good deed in a naughty world; yet economic theory 
has nothing to say." Goldenweiser (1947,3) stated that "at no time has it 
been more important for economists to have the respect and confidence 
of the public." Slichter's views on inflation generated much opposition 
among his  fellow economists (Mason 1961,  183), but in  the years that 
followed,  the economics profession gradually embraced a relationship 
that would lead to the demise of public esteem. The years between Gold-
enweiser"s  AEA  presidential  addre"s  (1947)  and  Samuelson's (1962) 
were  the  years of germination of this relationship; the  years  between 
1962 and Friedman's address (1968) were the years of colonization. The 
subsequent years saw an outbreak of nosological concerns about the eco-
nomics profession. There clearly needs to be a more detailed analysis of 
the process by which economists came to be loosened from their attach-
ment to the primacy of the goal of price stability, if for no other reason 
than the desire to avoid a repeat of this experiment. 
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